


JPRS-TND-93-014  
18 May 1993



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-014

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18 May 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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### **Ambassador Comments on UN Resolution on DPRK**

*OW1205140193 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0644 GMT 12 May 93*

[By reporter Li Jianxiong (2621 0256 7160)]

[Text] United Nations, 11 May (XINHUA)—The UN Security Council [UNSC] today passed a resolution with a vote of 13-0 and two abstentions, calling on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] to reconsider its decision, announced on 12 March, to withdraw from the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. China and Pakistan abstained from the voting.

The DPRK Government issued a statement on 12 March condemning the United States and the Republic of Korea [ROK] for resuming the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises and the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] for adopting a resolution requesting inspections of its military locations, and announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In the resolution, the UNSC asked the DPRK to fulfill its obligations undertaken on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the treaty, and to abide by the "Safeguards Agreement" signed with the IAEA in accordance with the stipulation of the resolution adopted by the IAEA board of governors on 25 February.

The resolution also asked Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA, to continue to consult with the DPRK in the hope that problems referred to in the findings of the IAEA board of governors can be solved. The findings of the investigations said that the DPRK has not fulfilled its obligations in accordance with the "Safeguards Agreement" it signed with the IAEA. It also said that the IAEA has not been able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials, which should be placed under control under the safeguards methods, for the use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Li Zhaoxing, China's permanent representative to the United Nations, delivered an explanatory speech before the UNSC voting. He said: As a signatory nation to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China has consistently opposed nuclear proliferation and supported a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. It does not hope to see any nuclear weapons in the DPRK, whether they are from the north, the south, or a third side.

Ambassador Li said: The nuclear issue related to the DPRK is mainly a matter between the DPRK and the IAEA, the United States, and the ROK. It should be properly settled through direct dialogues and consultations between the DPRK and the three sides. China is opposed to the practice of applying pressures. He said: China has always objected to the issue being handled by the Security Council, let alone having a resolution adopted on the issue by the Council. This is because the

Council's intervention is apt to complicate the matter and lead to gradual intensification and escalation of the contradictions.

Li Zhaoxing pointed out: Currently, the DPRK nuclear issue is at a crucial and sensitive stage. The DPRK has held consultations with the IAEA and begun contacts with the United States. China welcomes this progress and hopes that all sides will adopt a pragmatic, flexible, and constructive attitude during their talks so as to achieve a positive outcome.

Speaking at the UNSC, Pak Kil-yon, DPRK permanent representative to the United Nations, said: "The draft resolution aims to infringe upon the DPRK sovereignty and stifle its socialist system. Although adoption of the draft resolution was forced upon by a nuclear superpower, the DPRK will resolutely resist it...."

Pak Kil-yon said: "The withdrawal of the DPRK from the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a self-defense measure as its interests are threatened." "The action of the IAEA officials proved that they have discarded the principle of impartiality and become servants implementing the U.S. policy."

### **Free Electron Laser Device Developed by Defense University**

*HK1105040593 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Apr 93 p 1*

[Report by Li Wei (2621 1792): "University of Science and Technology for National Defense Succeeds in Manufacturing Free Electron Laser Device"]

[Text] Changsha, 26 Apr (JIEFANGJUN BAO)—A scientific achievement laying the foundation for the state's high technology was made by the University of Science and Technology for National Defense when the Chilunkov [qi lun ke fu 1148 0178 2688 1133] free electron laser device passed experts' appraisal today. A retrieval operation on the international on-line machine [jing guo ji lian ji jian suo 4842 0948 7139 5114 2623 2914 4792] showed the device has reached the international level of devices of same type of the late 1980's.

Since Soviet scientist Chilunkov discovered the blue-light radioactive electric bunch [lan guang fu she dian shu 5663 0342 6553 1410 7193 2631] set off by high-energy electrons in the water in 1934, research in free electron lasers has become a subject of great interest in the laser technology field worldwide. Under the leadership of Professor Li Chuanlu, a scientific research group of the University of Science and Technology for National Defense, after four years of hard work, succeeded in generating microwaves in 1990 for the first time in China, thus opening a path for studying the Chilunkov free electron laser. In the last two years, the group made a breakthrough in the technology through carrying out in-depth research.



**Beijing Rejects Pakistan Missile Supply Claims**

*HK0705054293 Hong Kong AFP in English 0515 GMT  
7 May 93*

[Text] Beijing, May 7 (AFP)—China rejected claims Friday that it is still delivering surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan but did not issue an outright denial.

A New York Times report Thursday said Washington had evidence that China was still supplying these missiles to Islamabad, breaking a pledge it made a year ago.

But a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said Friday that "China's position to observe the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) remains unchanged."

The MTCR bans the transfer of missile technology to countries or regions considered sensitive. The spokesman made no other comment.

The Times, citing an unnamed U.S. official, said satellite photographs of the Pakistani port of Karachi showed Chinese shipments of M-11 missiles had not stopped.

State Department spokesman Joe Snyder, while not commenting directly on the report, said the U.S. administration was "deeply concerned" about missile proliferation. "We continue to monitor closely and carefully .... reports suggesting the Chinese are not abiding by their commitments."

The M-11 missile, with a range of 1,000 kilometers (650 miles), could be used to carry nuclear bombs that Pakistan is believed to have developed.

Beijing has always denied selling missiles to Pakistan, with which it has close ties, particularly at the military level.

A year ago China promised then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that it would comply with an international agreement banning the sale of medium- and long-range missiles.

At the time, the United States said that China was also planning to sell the M-11 missile to Syria, Iran, and possibly Libya.

In late 1992, U.S. intelligence determined that China was openly selling missiles to Pakistan to take advantage of the closing months of the administration of President George Bush.

Congress is currently considering a bill that would make renewing Most Favoured Nation trade status to China contingent on Beijing stopping its alleged human rights abuses and its export of missiles and nuclear-related technology.

## JAPAN

### British Paper Reports on Plutonium in Country

SK1205121593 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1050 GMT 12 May 93

[Text] Pyongyang, May 12 (KCNA)—Japan secretly introduced more than one ton of plutonium from Britain, which is enough to make 100 nuclear bombs, the British newspaper OBSERVER reported on May 9.

Japan had shipped in a large amount of plutonium from France in several installments.

Japan's stock of plutonium at present amounts to scores of tons.

Not content with it, however, Japan undertook some time ago a large-scale nuclear reprocessing facility project whereby to extract five tons of plutonium annually.

This vividly proves how desperately Japan is trying to become a nuclear power.

Japan's nuclear development poses a great threat to the Korean people in particular. Because Japan, situated very near to Korea geographically, has not given up her despicable intention to stifle the Korean socialist system. [sentence as received]

It is shameless, indeed, of Japan to raise a hue and cry over the fictitious "nuclear arms development" of the DPRK, while herself making haste with nuclear development threatening it.

Japan must drop the bad habit of taking issue with others and promptly give up its design to become a nuclear power, not forgetting the lessons of history as a nuclear victim.

## NORTH KOREA

### Daily Urges Abolition of All Nuclear Weapons

SK0905055693 *Pyongyang KOREAN CENTRAL BROADCASTING NETWORK in Korean* 0015 GMT  
9 May 93

[NODONG SINMUN 9 May special article: "Nuclear Threat Should Be Removed From Its Source"]

[Text] The imperialist ruling circles and their propaganda means are recently loudly clamoring that since nuclear weapons of superpowers are a war deterrence, they do not impose any threat. In the case of nonnuclear states, however, even suspicion of their nuclear weapons development works as a great threat. This is indeed a ridiculous claim.

Even after the collapse of the Cold War structure of East-West confrontation, the imperialists' maneuvers for reinforcing nuclear arms are continuing and mankind has been unable to free itself from nuclear threat.

For mankind to free itself from nuclear threat, the source of nuclear threat must be precisely revealed and nuclear weapons must be comprehensively and completely removed from the earth.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: As long as there are nuclear weapons on our globe, the danger of nuclear war cannot be removed and mankind is unable to free itself from constant nuclear threat.

Nuclear threat has been imposed on mankind because nuclear weapons were developed and have been used in wars as a mass lethal means.

As long as nuclear weapons exist on the earth, the danger of nuclear war cannot be removed. Nuclear weapons are a source of disaster threatening existence and civilization of mankind.

Today the one who gives the greatest nuclear threat to mankind is the United States which developed and used nuclear weapons for the first time in the world and which possesses them most

During World War II, the United States manufactured nuclear weapons for the first time and dropped them over the heads of the Japanese, and massacred the people en masse. Thus, it committed a most atrocious crime.

For nearly half a century since then, the United States developed and manufactured on a large scale the mass lethal weapons and deployed them in many places around the world. Thus, it undisguisedly threatened and blackmailed other countries and other people.

All this fact eloquently illustrates that the United States is the very one that is increasing the nuclear threat to the world's people. Nevertheless, the United States and its followers, keeping silent on this solemn fact, fabricated fictitious nuclear suspicions of our republic, and are running amok with a farce on so-called sanctions and so forth.

This is a stratagem designed to divert elsewhere the world people's denunciation of the United States' nuclear blackmail policy by concealing the true source of the nuclear threat imposed on mankind.

Such maneuvers by the United States are related to its arrogant way of thinking that it will not be subject to any punishment whatever crime it may commit but it can punish any nation that hurts its feelings by freely putting an unjust label on this nation.

This is a brigandish theory and tyranny of strength to trample underfoot justice and impartiality and to establish a system of the law of the jungle in the international community. The U.S. ruling circles are attempting to support such a system with nuclear weapons.

The U.S. gibberish that its nuclear weapons are a war deterrence is a sophistry designed to continue maintaining its absolute nuclear superiority, to bring other countries to its knees with nuclear blackmail, and to become the world's emperor who controls the destiny of mankind. This is indeed a very dangerous allegation.

If such allegation is accepted, mankind will never be able to free itself from nuclear threat and will be reduced to a slave of the United States' nuclear blackmail. No nuclear weapon can work as war deterrence. It will merely increase the danger of nuclear war and will threaten the existence of mankind and the peace of the world.

In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind from its source, the testing, production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons must be prohibited and various kinds of existing nuclear weapons must be reduced. Besides, all nuclear weapons must be gradually abolished comprehensively and completely.

Only by doing this, can mankind free itself from nuclear calamities finally and maintain world peace on a solid base.

What is important in this is that the nation, which possesses nuclear weapons most and actually creates nuclear threat, should begin abolishing nuclear weapons. The first target nation is the United States which creates a nuclear threat in this world.

Today the aspirations and desire of mankind to live under peaceful, stable, and free circumstances free from the danger of nuclear war are increasing each day.

Unless one abolishes U.S. nuclear weapons completely, such desire of mankind cannot be achieved nor can the nuclear threat be removed from its source.

It is cheating for the United States to loudly talk about removing the nuclear threat without abolishing its own nuclear weapons. In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind, nuclear proliferation by the United States should be prevented. What is important in doing so is to thoroughly reject the double standards in fulfilling obligations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to keep the principle of impartiality.

The United States, discarding its missions as a trustee nation of the treaty, actively supported the development of nuclear weapons by South Africa and Israel in order to make them nuclear states.

It is an undisguised secret that the United States supported the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan from a long time ago. Japan's becoming a great nuclear state imposes a new great threat to peace in Asia and the world. It is a common task of the peaceloving people in Asia and the world to prevent Japan's nuclear armament.

This being the reality, the United States, turning a deaf ear to all of this, fabricated suspicions of nuclear development in our country—a nonnuclear state—and kicked off a farce. This is a maneuver to stifle [apsal] our republic.

In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind, nuclear weapons testing and the development of new nuclear weapons should be suspended and nuclear weapons that have been deployed in other countries should be withdrawn.

Under the signboards of nuclear disarmament, the imperialists are continuously developing and producing new nuclear weapons, instead of reducing old nuclear weapons. That the United States has not suspended the testing of nuclear weapons is aimed at promoting offensive capabilities of nuclear weapons and at qualitatively improving the nuclear weapons system. This means an act of increasing the danger of nuclear war.

Test and development of nuclear weapons must be suspended forever. At the same time, nuclear weapons that have been deployed in other countries must be withdrawn. In particular, it has emerged as an urgent mission to force the United States to withdraw all nuclear weapons from South Korea where the danger of nuclear war is greatest.

To remove the nuclear threat to mankind, nuclear states should not conduct nuclear war exercise against the other country. The United States is staging nuclear war exercise in many areas of the world. It is continuously staging a reckless nuclear war exercise in the Asian-Pacific region, in particular, on the Korean peninsula.

If a nuclear war breaks out in Korea, it will bring about numerous disasters to world people. The Team Spirit nuclear war exercise should not be staged on the Korean peninsula any longer.

It is one of the important guarantees for removing the nuclear threat to mankind and for ensuring peace to establish and expand nuclear-free, peace zones in many parts of the world. If world people establish nuclear-free, peace zones throughout the world, the danger of nuclear war can be prevented.

By putting forward reasonable proposals for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, our party and the government of the republic are actively striving to realize them.

Our people will, as ever, actively make efforts, hand in hand with peaceloving people of the world, to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, to remove nuclear threat to mankind by completely abolishing all nuclear weapons and to ensure durable peace in the world.

#### **Intelligence Sought on ROK's Russian Technology Imports**

*SK0805072793 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
8 May 93 p 2*

[Text] North Korea has very sensitively reacted to recent ROK efforts to import high-tech defense industry-related technology from Russia, including airplane and military technology. North Korea is collecting intelligence on this.

Relevant Russian and ROK businesses on 7 May said that North Korea is collecting intelligence on the ROK's move in order to take specific countermeasures as the ROK is actively contacting possible suppliers to import advanced technology for medium-size airplanes and aviation and high-tech military technology from Russia.

North Korea asked the (Miyashichef) company, which the ROK Aviation Research Center and other ROK domestic businesses are deeply interested in, to provide information on the company's negotiations with the ROK. In addition, North Korea also asked several Russian defense industry businesses in contact with the ROK side to provide similar information.

#### Text of UN 'Draft Resolution' on DPRK

SK0805050893 Seoul YONHAP in English 0456 GMT  
8 May 93

[Text] United Nations, May 7 (YONHAP)—Following is the full text of the draft resolution that was distributed to members of the United Nations security council on Friday:

#### Draft Resolution

A.—Noting the critical importance of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (the treaty), and emphasising the integral role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and security;

B.—Recalling the security council presidential statement of 8 April 1993 in which the members of the council welcome all efforts aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage IAEA to continue its consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue in the DPRK;

C.—Recalling also the joint declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, which includes establishment of a credible and effective bilateral inspection regime and a pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities;

D.—Noting with satisfaction that the DPRK is party to the treaty and has concluded a fullscope safeguards agreement as required by that treaty;

E.—Having considered with regret the letter from the minister for foreign affairs of the DPRK dated 12 March 1993 addressed to the president of the council concerning the intention of the government of the DPRK to withdraw from the treaty;

F.—Having also considered with regret the IAEA Board of Governors' findings contained in its resolution of 1 April 1993 that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403), and

that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded under the terms of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

G.—Noting the 1 April 1993 statement by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States which questions whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from the treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty;

H.—Noting the letter of reply by the DPRK to the director-general of IAEA dated April 22 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the director-general to hold consultations with the DPRK on the implementation of the safeguards agreement. Noting also that the DPRK has expressed its willingness to seek a negotiated solution to this issue;

I.—Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between DPRK and IAEA and the prospect of contacts between DPRK and other member states:

1. Calls upon the DPRK to reaffirm its commitment to the treaty and to retract the announcement contained in the letter of 12 March 1993;

2. Further calls upon the DPRK to honor its non-proliferation obligations under the treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993;

3. Requests the director-general of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject of the board of governors' findings and to report to the security council on his efforts in due time;

4. Urges all members states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this resolution and encourages them to take all appropriate steps to facilitate a solution;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further security council action if necessary.

#### Reportage on Resolution of DPRK Withdrawal

##### South Korean Ministry 'Reasonably Pleased'

SK1205025093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0226 GMT  
12 May 93

[YONHAP "News Analysis" by Yi Tong-min: "International Community Moves Along Its Track on North Korea Nuclear Issue"]

[Text] Seoul, May 12 (YONHAP)—The international community moved right along its set track Wednesday with the adoption of a Security Council resolution on North Korea.



The two-rail track has been that of both stick and carrot. The Security Council handed North Korea the first stick.

We are reasonably pleased, a Foreign Ministry official said in reaction to the resolution. But real hard work begins from here.

The resolution is expected to temporarily suspend international action on North Korea's nuclear issue and launch bilateral approach. Expected soon is a high-level meeting between North Korea and the United States. Also expected soon is resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

The resolution, as it aimed, set the background for these negotiations. The last of the five points declares that the council decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further security council action as necessary.

Such a declaration carries heavy weight because it is by the Security Council, which represents the global community.

Although concerned nations may approach Pyongyang with softened action, there will always be this implied threat of sanctions looming over North Korea.

The resolution showed North Korea that China, the last faithful ally, is limited in coming to Pyongyang's defense against global action when Beijing abstained from voting, adding further weight to sanction warnings.

No less significant was the fact that Brazil, which opposed strong wording in the resolution and said it would abstain, changed its mind at the last minute and voted yes.

Participation of Brazil, a non-NPT [nuclear nonproliferation treaty] member, shows the commitment of the international community to nuclear non-proliferation.

Seoul officials say efforts now will focus on bilateral negotiations. Assistant foreign minister Shin Kee-bock left for Washington last weekend for policy coordination before the North Korea-U.S. high-level contact.

Sin and U.S. officials are expected to seek face-saving measures for North Korea, giving Pyongyang just enough excuse to return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) without it showing that North Korea kneeled to international pressure.

The key face-saving measures would include downscaling of the annual South Korea-U.S. military maneuver Team Spirit and the opening of American military bases in South Korea to outside inspection in exchange for seeing the nuclear installations in North Korea.

The mood is ripe for North Korea to be positive about solving the nuclear problem, officials here say.

North Korea definitely stands to gain compared to the situation before March 12, the date Pyongyang announced it was bolting from the NPT, one Ministry official said.

Indeed, North Korea at a minimum gets high-level talks with the United States.

South Korea will also attempt negotiations with North Korea. Officials here say there are things Washington cannot give Pyongyang but Seoul can, such as economic cooperation.

North Korea's nuclear matter has temporarily left the United Nations, and officials here say it is entirely up to Pyongyang whether it goes back to the global body.

### Minister on Avoidance of Sanctions

SK1205035193 Seoul YONHAP in English 0327 GMT  
12 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 12 (YONHAP)—North Korea must both return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s special inspection if it wants to avoid U.N. sanctions, Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said Wednesday.

It is clearly stated in the U.N. resolution that minimum requirement is for North Korea to rescind its decision to withdraw from NPT and comply with IAEA's special inspection, Han told a press conference.

The United States, in its high-level contact with North Korea, will emphasize that, in addition to these demands, Pyongyang must accept inter-Korean simultaneous inspection as well, Han said.

The foreign minister's remarks peg down South Korea's position amid suggestions within the government, given recently by Unification Minister Han Wan-sang, that North Korea's return to NPT is enough.

Yes, Han said when asked if North Korea must meet both conditions in the resolution in order to avoid international sanctions.

The U.N. Security Council adopted the resolution calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision to leave NPT.

It urged the communist regime to comply with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the agency's resolution demanding special inspection on two highly suspected North Korean nuclear sites.

The resolution passed with 13 yeases. China and Pakistan abstained.

Han attached special significance to the fact that China abstained, predicting that Beijing's action at the Security Council will exert powerful influence on North Korea to actively solve its nuclear problem.

China sent a strong message to North Korea by allowing the resolution to pass the Security Council. It has shown it cannot but participate in the global movement for nuclear non-proliferation, said Han.

North Korea can no longer expect China to take its side when time comes for global sanctions against Pyongyang, said Han.

The foreign minister said the upcoming North Korea-U.S. high-level meeting will be strictly limited to the nuclear issue.

The high-level contact is within the framework of the U.N. resolution recommending all member states to encourage North Korea to comply with the resolution, he told the press conference.

There will be no new proposals or promises to be made at the contact, he said.

If Pyongyang refuses to act positively despite the first resolution, the security council is expected to take the warned additional steps before June 12 when North Korea's NPT withdrawal becomes final, according to the foreign minister.

He suggested that inter-Korean dialogue may reopen in the near future, saying the possibility has always been inherent.

We will watch the results of North Korea-U.S. contact, he said.

**Pyongyang Rejects 'Unreasonable' UN Resolution**  
*SK1205113093 Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
*1113 GMT 12 May 93*

["DPRK Government Resolutely Rejects Unreasonable 'Resolution' of U.N. Security Council"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 12 (KCNA) - A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement today denouncing the unreasonable "resolution" adopted at the United Nations Security Council.

The statement says:

An unreasonable "resolution" over the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted at the United Nations Security Council on May 11 despite opposition from different countries.

Admission to or withdrawal from an international treaty belongs to the sovereignty of each country.

The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive measure taken by the DPRK exercising the right pursuant to the NPT under the extraordinary situation in which the supreme interests of the country were exposed to grave threat.

Therefore, the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT is not a matter to be discussed at the U.N. Security Council. The United Nations has no legal pretext or ground to adopt a "resolution" over this matter.

It is unreasonable for the U.N. Security Council to talk about "reconsideration" of the DPRK's measure to withdraw from the NPT.

The U.N. Charter has no article which stipulates that signatories to an international treaty should not withdraw from the treaty or that issue should be taken with withdrawal from the treaty.

The "double standard" policy of the U.N. Security Council can by no means be justified in conniving at the misconduct of the offender and putting pressure on the victim.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resolutely rejects the "resolution" of the U.N. Security Council, considering it an interference in its internal affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereignty.

What is done by the United States and its followers at the U.N. Security Council reminds one of the 1950s when the Korean issue was discussed illegally at the U.N. Security Council.

If the latest "resolution" of the United Nations Security Council was adopted from motives of following the example of the "resolution" in the 1950s, the situation would get worse.

At a time when negotiations between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] are ripe so that the IAEA's inspection of the DPRK and DPRK-U.S. negotiations may be possible, the UN Security Council stated only yesterday through a "president's statement" that it was encouraging negotiations and is now blocking it. This is a very abnormal and contradictory act.

This proves that the United States is resorting to means of pressure, not to means of negotiations in the settlement of problems and the UN Security Council has been appropriated for the schemes of the United States, a belligerent party against the DPRK, to stifle the socialist system of Korea.

Such unjustifiable "double-dealing" policy of the United States through the UN Security Council has created grave difficulties in the way of negotiations between the DPRK and the IAEA.

The "nuclear problem" on the Korean peninsula cannot be solved by "strongarm acts" and "pressure."

The United States and its followers, some other member nations of the UN Security Council, must not mistake for an expression of weakness the DPRK's stand and efforts to solve the problem through negotiations on the basis of mutual trust.

If the UN Security Council finally puts such unreasonable "pressure" on us as "sanctions" on the basis of this "resolution", we cannot construe it otherwise than a "declaration of war" against the DPRK.

It is the United States that gave rise to the "nuclear problem" on the Korean peninsula and it is also the



United States that initiated the adoption of the "resolution". So, the United States will be held entirely responsible for all the consequences to be entailed therefrom.

### **DPRK Predicted To Possess 2-3 Nuclear Bombs by 1995**

*SK1405053993 Seoul YONHAP in English 0530 GMT 14 May 93*

[Text] Seoul, May 14 (YONHAP)—North Korea is capable of possessing two to three nuclear bombs next year or in 1995 if its nuclear weapons development program is not stopped now, the Agency for National Security Planning [NSP] predicted Friday.

The agency made the prediction in a report on North Korea to the National Assembly National Defense Committee.

North Korea's nuclear weapons would be a crucial factor for the security of northeast Asia, the agency said.

Kim Chong-il, Son and heir to President Kim Il-song, put both the military and the Communist Party under his control by becoming chairman of the Workers' Party Central Military Commission in April but because of North Korea's sagging economy, manifest in a sharp decline in the supply of grain and a 40-percent factory operating rate, domestic unrest may occur following the death of Kim Il-song, the agency said.

In order to ease tension between the South and North resulting from the instability of the North Korean system and the nuclear issue, the agency recommended that South Korea solidify bilateral cooperation in the security field with the United States and raise the national strength and prestige abroad by actively taking part in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Although the possibility of a world war in the near future had diminished following the collapse of the cold war, the agency said, 11 of the 54 regional conflicts currently taking place occurred in the post-cold war period.

It was inevitable that the balance of power surrounding the Korean peninsula would shift because of rapid changes in the international political environment, the agency said.

The agency also said the United States had asked South Korea to increase its share of support for the U.S. troops stationed in this country 22 percent for the 1994 fiscal year.

### **UN Resolution Declared 'Unjust,' Retraction Urged**

*SK1405053793 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0506 GMT 14 May 93*

["Unjust UN 'Resolution' Must Be Revoked"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)—The UN Security Council reportedly adopted an unjust "resolution" on

May 11 calling on the DPRK to "retract the announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permit nuclear inspections", and threatened that "other steps may have to be taken, if necessary".

This is a crude violation of the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK and an open strongarm act designed to stifle Korean socialism.

The adoption of a "resolution" by the UN encroaching upon the sovereignty of the DPRK over its fictitious "nuclear problem" is a fatal blot on the U.N. charter.

The coercive adoption of the unjust "resolution" by the UN against the DPRK's self-defensive measure is a brigandish act which cannot go down with anyone, for the UN charter has no stipulation on taking issue with withdrawal from a treaty.

As a matter of fact, it is not the DPRK which has neither intention nor capacity to develop nuclear arms, but the United States which has deployed a large number of nuclear weapons in South Korea and threatens the DPRK at all times, that must be dealt with at the UN.

The United States, the very criminal which should be brought to justice at the UN and face sanctions from the international community, however, forced the adoption of a "resolution", acting as an "international judge" in the UN arena. This makes it plain that the "resolution" is nothing but a club brandished by a robber.

It is a big mistake if the United States thinks it can frighten the DPRK with the "resolution". No "resolution" can work on us.

The UN must renounce the "double standard" policy of putting pressure on the victim while conniving at the deed of the assailant and immediately revoke the "resolution" against the DPRK which can never be justified.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

### **Envoy Denies 'Secret Meeting' With DPRK Counterpart**

*SK1105021293 Seoul YONHAP in English 0005 GMT 11 May 93*

[Text] Beijing, May 11 (YONHAP)—South Korean Ambassador to China No Chae-won denied a South Korean newspaper report Monday that he held secret talks with his North Korean counterpart, Chu Chang-chun, at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing on May 4.

I did meet Ambassador Chu and exchange brief greetings with him at a diplomatic function which was attended by ambassadors of many other countries. No told reporters. But I have never held such a secret meeting.

The atmosphere is not even conducive to such a contact right now. No added.

No is scheduled to return home May 26. He will be replaced by Ambassador Hwang Pyong-tae on May 31.

In Seoul, Vice Foreign Minister Hong Sun-yong also denied as groundless the report in the SEOUL SINMUN that No and Chu had met and discussed problems related to the North Korean nuclear issue.

In an exclusive front-page story, the SEOUL SINMUN said that No met with Chu and reported back to the Foreign Ministry.

The newspaper quoted No as saying in his report to the ministry that he had received an impression that the North Korean attitude has softened this time, indicating that he had met with Chu at least once before.

The SEOUL SINMUN said that No, referring to the opinion in some international quarters that China still has influence over North Korea, said Chu told him that North Korea and China maintain a relationship of equality.

**POLAND****Defense Systems Contract Signed With France**

*LD0705214893 Warsaw PAP in English 2111 GMT 7 May 93*

[Text] Warsaw, May 7—Polish firm "Radwar" and France's "Thomson-CSF" signed in Warsaw on Friday an agreement on cooperation in the production of military reconnaissance and command systems.

The agreement will make it possible to equip the Polish Armed Forces with Polish-made devices compatible with Western standards and to start export production.

Col. Jerzy Kade of the Ministry of Industry and Trade stressed the systems produced under the agreement will make the Polish Army independent of the systems used in the former Warsaw Treaty states. According to Kade the talks on the agreement proceeded slowly since the sensitive production of defence systems requires full confidence in the partner. "Thomson, unlike the American firms, decided to start the talks," Kade stressed.

Thomson's President Giscard d'Estaing told a press conference here that the firm's strategy is to create a zone of common defence industry in Europe while Poland's role in ensuring security in that part of Europe is extremely important.

Poland's Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz stressed on his part that "the new conditions call for cooperation allowing Poland to acquire technologies used by the Western armies."

**ROMANIA****Report on Ceausescu Effort To Build Nuclear Bomb**

*AU1305184793 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 May 93 p 8*

[Emil Berdeli, Vasile Stanca article: "SRI Sources Correct Information Disclosed by Ion Mihai Pacepa: The

Parts of the Nuclear Weapon Were Not in Baneasa Forest, But Next to Otopeni Bridge"]

[Text] In one of the installments of the text written by Ion Mihai Pacepa and recently published by EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, the former head of DIE [Department for Foreign Intelligence] claimed that [in the Ceausescu era] they were working on the plans of medium-range missiles provided with nuclear warheads in a secret house in Baneasa forest.

Sources close to SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] have told us that actually that house was placed by the road between Bucharest and Ploiesti, next to the bridge in Otopeni.

In the 1968-1970 period, Ceausescu had ordered the establishment of a large espionage network intended to obtain the documentation necessary for production of the nuclear weapon. It is already known that those Securitate actions were directed both against the West and against the East. The production of such weapons was intended to intimidate both the NATO adversaries and those that were members of the Warsaw Pact. Another goal was to become able to sell such weapons to Middle East countries.

The success obtained by the Caraman network in collecting military information is already known, and it has also become certain that the Securitate even managed to turn NATO political and military figures into collaborators.

Later, the house which General Pacepa wrongly places in Baneasa forest, was used as a telephone switch wiretapping telephone conversations in the northern part of Bucharest. The technicians working there were subordinated to the former [Securitate] unit TONOLA [capitalization as published].

It is worth mentioning that all radioactive material that was to be used for the nuclear warheads was produced in Romania.

## BRAZIL

### German Banks Guarantee \$300 Million Loan for Angra-2

PY1405023093 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 13 May 93 p 14

[Text] Rio de Janeiro—The German banks KfW (state) and Dresner (private) have guaranteed to Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. [FCE] an additional loan of \$300 million (10.67 trillion cruzeiros) for the purchase of equipment and services from Germany for the Angra-2 nuclear plant. Duilio Russo, superintendent of the company's nuclear construction, reported that the two banks' representatives visited FCE in the beginning of the week. The loan conditions still have to be negotiated and submitted to the Attorney General's Office, to the national Congress, and for the federal government's endorsement for the release of these funds, which must take place within a one-year period.

According to Duilio Russo, the loan conditions are favorable because the principal will be paid only when the plant is completed and generating electric energy. The loan payment will be made with resources obtained from the sale of energy from Angra-2, Russo said. To finish this nuclear plant the FCE will have to spend \$1.377 billion (48.98 trillion cruzeiros), \$550 million (19.56 trillion cruzeiros) of which already exists from a credit line granted in 1976. In this manner, the FCE has \$850 million (30.23 trillion cruzeiros) and will have to contribute \$527 million (18.74 trillion cruzeiros) of its own resources, which can be achieved with an increase in

the price of electric energy, an increase in the company's capital, or the opening of its capital.

Yesterday, representatives of FCE, the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), and the National Commission of Nuclear Energy Workers (Contren) [Comissao Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Energia Nuclear] held a meeting at the Group to Follow up the Nuclear Issue [Grupo de Acompanhamento da Questao Nuclear] of the Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ) Science and Culture Forum to discuss Angra-2's construction.

Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, a UFRJ physicist and coordinator of the Science and Culture Forum, yesterday recommended in Rio de Janeiro that the Angra-1 nuclear plant be reconnected only after the reactor and dome are submitted to an international audit. He said there is no risk of environmental contamination from the leaks found in the fuel rod assemblies.

Pinguelli believes the problem might have been caused by incompatibility between the German Siemens technology fuel project and the reactor manufactured by U.S. Westinghouse. The auditing defended by Pinguelli Rosa seeks a more thorough test of the internal steam generator tubes made with inconel-600, the same component that had problems in France, the physicist said.

He added that the two Angra-1 steam generators are showing corrosion in the tubes. Of the 8,000 tubes, 400 already are in jeopardy and have been isolated. He feels that within five to 10 years the steam generators will have to be changed because of decay. The change will have to be made much sooner than the life predicted for the generators, he said.

## INDIA

**Details of Nuclear Weapons Program Revealed**

93WP0150A Calcutta SUNDAY in English 24 Apr 93  
pp 34-38

[Article by Indrani Banerjee: "The Secrets of Kahuta"]

[Text] Sometime last year, Pakistani newspapers carried a mysterious article on a strange stone-like object found in the vicinity of Kahuta, the country's top-secret nuclear complex called the 'Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratories'.

The story alleged that the object was some kind of a sensor which transmitted information on the progress of Pakistan's nuclear programme to a foreign power via an international network satellite. This object, the report claimed, had been accidentally discovered by a wood-cutter a few years ago.

Since the device was marked with a Roman 'II', the Pakistani authorities began searching for another sensor, presumably marked 'I'. The report said that local people had been told that they must immediately report the discovery of any doubtful object in the vicinity of Kahuta.

The story sounds straight out of a science fiction novel. But whatever the truth, there is no denying that Pakistan has always been more than a little paranoid about its facilities in Kahuta. It is only recently that the country admitted that it had developed nuclear weapons capability. And Kahuta, everybody presumes, is where it all happened.

Kahuta nevertheless continues to breed fiction and raises more questions than answers. Perhaps the most vexing questions are about what really does Kahuta hold, how large and advanced are the facilities centered around the laboratories there, and last but not the least, what are the implications of all this? It is only now that some of these secrets are beginning to be told.

**The Bomb Factory**

From the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, Kahuta is 35 km away. Nestled amidst low hills and dotted with old temples, Kahuta was once just a pretty little town. Today, it is one of the most heavily guarded places in the world. All access routes to the town are blocked by tanks and military checkpoints.

The core area, where the laboratories are situated, is fenced in by barbed wire and defended by batteries of anti-aircraft missiles. The airspace over Kahuta is constantly patrolled by armed air defence fighter aircraft.

In the early 1980s, a couple of French diplomats tried to get to Kahuta. They were stopped enroute, pulled out of their cars and thrashed within an inch of their lives. The French protested. Pakistan expressed its regret over the incident. The message was, however, clear: that the

Pakistani authorities would not tolerate any messing around in the area. A few years later, an English journalist made another attempt. Result: he was beaten up, hospitalised and deported.

Virtually everything known about Kahuta comes from leaks, statements and official briefings of intelligence agencies. The CIA has perhaps provided the greatest amount of information. And this January, the chief of Russia's external intelligence agency (FIS), Dr. Yevgeny Primakov, publicly came out with a full assessment of Pakistan's nuclear capability.

Kahuta, he confirmed, was the centre of Pakistan's bomb programme: it had a factory of ultra-high speed centrifuges capable of producing weapons-grade uranium for as many as 12 nuclear explosive devices a year.

This was an astonishing disclosure, altering as it does previous scenarios based on assumptions that Pakistan would be able to fabricate just one or two bombs per year. From the Primakov paper, from source material already leaked or otherwise made available by other intelligence agencies, and the testimonies of foreigners arrested for supplying nuclear material to Pakistan, today we have a pretty clear idea of what is inside Kahuta.

The labs at Kahuta comprise four main halls housing cascades of centrifuges—about 10,000 to 14,000 in all. This is the heart of the atom bomb manufacturing business. These centrifuges are based on designs produced by the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, Amsterdam, and Ultra Centrifuge Netherlands (UCN), Almelo. These high-speed centrifuges made of aluminium and arranged in cascades constitute a relatively cheap method of extracting bomb grade isotopes (U-238 and U-233).

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, after whom the Kahuta laboratories are named, stole the detailed centrifuge designs, the metallurgical know-how and a list of foreign suppliers from the UCN, where he was employed between 1972 and 1975. How Dr. Khan pulled off this remarkable feat of nuclear espionage has recently been published in a book titled *The Islamic Bomb* authored by S. Weissman and H. Krosney.

The book provides a fascinating account of how Khan used a combination of charm, academic connections and large amounts of money to steal the secrets of the centrifuge. He later set up a worldwide network of companies and individuals to clandestinely acquire the components and raw material for the centrifuges and the bomb.

West German companies like CES Kalthof, Neue Technologies GMBH and Transnuclear, and a Belgian organisation, Belgonucleaire, wholeheartedly supported Dr. Khan's procurement network before they were eventually caught. Initially, US companies in general were more circumspect and in many cases tipped off the authorities and helped make sensational arrests. However, a recent



article by Pulitzer prize winning journalist Seymour Hersh in *The New Yorker* suggests that the Reagan administration had allowed Pakistan to procure nuclear-related goods from the USA. Richard Barlow, the CIA's top expert on the Pakistani nuclear programme, was ultimately forced to resign when he continued to investigate nuclear materials smuggling by Pakistan and objected to misleading congressional briefings on the Pakistani bomb programme.

It now appears that Pakistan formally decided to pursue the centrifuge route to uranium enrichment on 31 July, 1976, that is after Dr. Khan quit the Netherlands and returned to Pakistan where scientists were still struggling with plutonium extraction problems. Khan convinced the then Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, to opt for the uranium bomb instead of the plutonium bomb. The enrichment of uranium oxide ores (yellow cake), and recycling of nuclear wastes was done through the centrifuge method, where uranium hexafluoride is evaporated and spun in ultra-high speed centrifuges to separate the isotopes of uranium. The entire process is time consuming, requires very high precision machinery and consumes huge amounts of electricity.

By June 1978, Pakistan had successfully tested a prototype centrifuge, and once this breakthrough was made, Dr. Khan was given the simultaneous clearance to set up two plants—a 54-centrifuge pilot plant at Sihala and a full-scale enrichment plant at Kahuta. Dr. Khan's team completed the civil works at Kahuta by 1979 and within the next two years, a cascade of 1,000 centrifuges capable of producing one nuclear bomb a year was ready. By 1983, 1,000 to 2,000 centrifuges had been added.

Today, the plant is believed to have 10,000 to 14,000 centrifuges. Sometime in the mid-1980s, Dr. Khan also managed to get hold of a German design for a more efficient centrifuge and the older centrifuges are now being replaced by maraging steel centrifuges.

According to the Primakov paper, Pakistan has the wherewithal to produce 12 bombs a year. This is enough to blow up all major urban centres in west and north India. But the Pakistanis by all accounts have no intention of stopping at that.

#### The Nuclear Network

To step up production of weapons grade uranium, Pakistan has built a second enrichment complex at Golra Sharif, also near Islamabad. According to information available with the Russian intelligence agency, enrichment facilities here are still under construction and its progress might have been impeded by US pressures and shortage of money. However, the Golra complex, according to Primakov, is most certainly also producing "components for nuclear explosive devices".

Pakistan now is also actively pursuing the second route to fission bomb production: via plutonium. When the more stable and much more abundant uranium isotope U-238 acquires a neutron and decays, plutonium is

formed. Plutonium is a natural by-product in all nuclear reactors and is easier to extract. In fact, the first few nuclear bombs produced all over the world (including India's bomb and the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were plutonium bombs. China is the only country, apart from Pakistan, which first developed a uranium bomb.

For Pakistan, the plutonium route was initially problematic because it did not have any unsafeguarded nuclear reactor. In fact, its nuclear power generation programme even today has made no headway whatsoever. Pakistan still has only two reactors—a 10 MW experimental reactor set up by the Americans at Nilore in 1965 and the 137 MW Canadian-supplied (KANUPP) nuclear power station at Karachi. Both reactors are under international safeguards, though it is known that Pakistan "diverted" unspecified amounts of spent fuel from the KANUPP reactor. The Chinese have agreed to set up a 300 MW nuclear reactor for Pakistan which would be under international safeguards but which could also be another big source for clandestine diversion of spent fuel.

At the same time, it has been discovered that Pakistan is building a 50 or 70 MW nuclear reactor on its own for plutonium production. From available information, it appears that this is a heavy-water reactor of the NRX type. Pakistan already has heavy water manufacturing facilities thanks to Belgonucleaire, which set up a 13-tonne-per-annum plant for this purpose at Multan in 1980. The exact status of the plutonium production reactor is not known.

But the other pieces are already in place. For instance, Pakistan has already built an unsafeguarded, experimental-scale plutonium separation facility known as the New Laboratories, PIN-STECH (NLP) near Rawalpindi. The NLP was ready as long back as in 1980 and was designed to handle 8-10 tonnes of spent fuel every year and produce in the process about 10-20 kg of weapons-grade plutonium.

In 1979, Pakistan had signed a contract with France for the construction of a much larger (100 tonnes per annum) reprocessing or plutonium separation plant at Chasma. The French backed out in 1978 after it got wind of Pakistan's weapons programme, but by then Pakistan had obtained all the major drawings for the plant. Pakistan, according to the Primakov disclosures, has built a usable chemical radiation facility at Chasma, which can be used for the extraction of plutonium. This plant was probably set up with assistance from Belgian and German companies.

It is also known that Pakistan did not have to wait for its own plutonium reactor. It illegally procured nuclear wastes and plutonium from the German company, Transnuklear, and from Sudan. The nuclear waste smuggling, according to European investigators, involved the nuclear waste dump at Mol, Belgium.

The CIA had been gathering information on the Pakistani bomb programme from 1970s and, by the early



1980s, must have had an idea of what was going on. But the Reagan administration at that time was pushing through its Afghanistan policy with great success and did not want to upset General Zia-ul Haq. So, while the US funnelled millions of dollars of arms into Afghanistan and Pakistan in an attempt to contain the Soviets, General Zia peacefully went about putting together one of the most formidable nuclear weapons production complexes in the world.

### The Super Citizens

If the more sanguine members of the Reagan and Bush administrations believed that they would be able to handle the Pakistan hierarchy responsible for the command and control of the country's nuclear weapons programme, they were sadly mistaken. Even though Gen. Zia perished in an air crash, his able successor, President Ghulam Ishaque Khan made it clear that no other force, within or outside the country, would be allowed to control or manipulate Pakistan's nuclear programme.

President Ishaque Khan's self-assurance was based on several factors, chief of which was the existence of a super citizenry or a coterie that had been built up by Gen. Zia. Pakistan, the canny General had decided, would only be a limited democracy. Key policy decisions and critical institutions would not be handled by the civilian government but by a small coterie—the super citizens.

Even today, matters relating to national security, foreign policy and the nuclear establishment are controlled by the coterie headed by the President and assisted by the army top brass, defence ministry and intelligence agency heads (most of whom are serving or former army officers), sections of the higher bureaucracy, and the nuclear hot shots, the most prominent of whom is Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Pakistan's super citizens are not accountable to anyone and can even prevent the Prime Minister from learning all about the country's nuclear programme. Benazir Bhutto was not told any of the details of the bomb programme. Even the present Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, has come to resent the absolute power of the coterie and has teamed up with Benazir, a former rival, in a desperate attempt to cut down the powers of the presidency.

### Islam's Muscleman:

Western and some Indian defence analysts have been arguing that the Pakistani bomb is dangerous because it is fundamentally a response to the Indian bomb programme. Their scenarios suggest that Pakistan would be tempted to use their bombs in a nuclear first strike in the course of an escalating conventional war. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on 25 March that the threat of a nuclear clash between India and Pakistan is on top of his "worry list".

But that really misses the point. Even Pakistan's maddest generals know that the real power of nuclear weapons lie in the threat they pose, not in their actual use. In short, nuclear weapons are useful and a source of 'power' because they act as a deterrent. As of now, Pakistan cannot really contemplate a first-strike scenario even if it has a sufficient number of bombs because it does not possess long-range missiles (above 300 km) or mid-air refuellers that would vastly extend the range of their strike aircraft. A limited first strike would prompt massive retaliatory nuclear strikes by India which would most certainly lead to the extinction of Pakistan.

The danger, therefore, is not that a mad Muslim will press the button to wipe out New Delhi but that the bomb is and will be increasingly used as an instrument of determent. Taking advantage of the fact that India will now think twice about launching a full-scale war, Pakistan can actively involve itself in a low-intensity conflict of the type being waged in Kashmir.

However, the bigger implications of the Pakistani bomb go beyond the subcontinental setting. This is something Western analysts do not openly talk about because it is obviously unsettling. But the fact is that Pakistan is the first Muslim-majority country (and an Islamic republic) to have successfully developed a nuclear weapons capability. This makes Pakistan the muscleman of the Muslim world. This is precisely the sort of image Pakistan's super citizens want to sell. They want to emerge as an alternative protector of the last resort. They hope that the Muslim countries, especially the more solvent ones, will, in turn, take care of Pakistan's foreign exchange requirements.

At least four Muslims countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Afghanistan and Bangladesh—have direct military ties of one sort or the other with Pakistan. At some stage, Pakistan could offer these or any other Muslim countries the guarantee of a nuclear umbrella. Saudi Arabia's purchase of Chinese intermediate ballistic missiles could well have been motivated by these considerations. The sale, it may be recalled, had made the US furious because the expensive missiles make no sense in a non-nuclear context. But Saudi missiles would make a lot of sense, if fitted with Pakistani nuclear warheads. But that possibility might have been blunted by the Gulf War and the determination of the Americans to keep the Pakistanis out of the any long term security arrangements in Saudi Arabia.

The possibility of a Muslim nuclear umbrella nevertheless continued to generate endlessly dangerous scenarios. Especially because Pakistan continues to keep all its options open and is still cultivating close ties with countries like Iran and Libya. In a parallel move, Pakistan had initiated the formation of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) along with Iran and Turkey. The ECO has roped in Afghanistan and the six Muslim-majority former Soviet central Asian republics. The ostensible agenda is trade. But Pakistan has its sights on

uranium sources in at least one of the republics and on the 2,000 MW nuclear reactor under construction in Kazakhstan.

The benefits of such groupings is not lost on either Iran or Turkey, both of whom nurture clear ambitions. Turkey has a special relationship with Pakistan and was supplying invertors to the Kahuta centrifuges till the US formally told Turkey to stop. Libya, too, has supplied funds and yellow cake (natural uranium oxide) to Pakistan.

In all these cases, there is a quid pro quo. There is evidence to suggest that Iraq too had cooperated with Pakistan at some stage and had been given the centrifuge designs stolen by Dr. Khan. Nuclear investigators in Iraq found centrifuge designs identical to those developed by the UCN. Similarly, Pakistan exchanges critical know-how with the Chinese, and procured in the process the proven design of a uranium bomb.

The point is that the implications of the Pakistani bomb programme go far beyond South Asia. The kind of relationships Pakistan has and is nurturing are a perfect setting for a proliferative regime. The more nuclear secrets leaked out, the greater is the probability of yet another nation acquiring the bomb. Nuclear proliferation in the inherently unstable Muslim world, which is riven by rivalries, is perhaps the single greatest danger the Pakistani bomb programme poses. And perhaps it is too late to do anything about it. For, the real secrets of Kahuta are embedded in the minds of the Pakistani bomb makers.

And nothing can erase this dangerous knowledge.

#### **'Ambiguity' of Nuclear Issued Viewed**

*BK1005151393 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 30 Apr 93 p 13*

[Article by Bhabani Sen Gupta]

[Text] The Government is understood to have set up a top-level task force with the foreign secretary, and secretaries to the ministries of defence, finance, commerce, and science and technology, chaired by the cabinet secretary, to prepare for the coming talks with the United States Government on the nuclear issue.

The talks with a representative of the Canadian Government did not apparently go very well from either's point of view. The Indian side knew that the Canadian side was less than satisfied and the Canadian side left with the impression that the Indian side was far from pleased. Before that, a small delegation from Japan, came to New Delhi to discuss the nuclear issue. But the Japanese mostly listened to what Indians had to say without saying very much on their own except making it known that Tokyo would strongly wish India to join the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] family.

The Canadian team gave an inkling of what must be now a larger pool of Western thinking: it is that India will have access to the most modern technology if it signed the NPT. When one recalls that Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany has said before leaving India that being outside the NPT might deny India access to the best technology one cannot help having a testy feeling that denial of the latest technology to those who would remain outside the NPT is being forged as a common Western strategy.

The Americans have been indulgent with India. When last year the foreign secretary went to Washington with the strategic concept of a "nuclear safe" South Asia, he found his American hosts in a listening mood. It is not such a bad idea, they told him (not exactly in these words), and we are quite interested, but you must tell us how you propose to translate your concept into reality. In other words, how do you propose to make South Asia nuclear safe?

The foreign secretary is believed to have asked for time to accomplish what undoubtedly would be a very creative job, and the Americans gave him time. In the meantime, they increased their pressure on Pakistan to make a dialogue with India possible with little or no success.

Early this year, a number of distinguished Americans who had signed a Carnegie Foundation booklet on Indo-American relations, urging the incoming Clinton administration to make India the fulcrum of its Asia policy, came to Delhi to attend a seminar with an equally distinguished group of Indians. The Carnegie team came up with a new strategic concept: nuclear restraint. It sounded sweet to Indian official ears though not to the ears of those who want India to cross the Rubicon and declare itself a nuclear power. I do not know if the "nuclear restraint" idea was discussed between Indian and U.S. officials. But it is not known that Americans were not hostile to the idea. Their position was quite simple: okay, we'll accept a South Asia bound by nuclear restraint but how does India propose to bring this about? What is the mechanism? How does India concretise the idea?

Early May, the United States will discuss the nuclear issue with three CIS republics—Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Each has a stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons on its territory. None of the three has signed the NPT. Nor indeed have those other CIS republics who have tactical nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Ukraine have taken up the position that it will sign the NPT only if its security from a nuclear attack is guaranteed by all the five nuclear powers. Belarus may adopt a similar position. Kazakhstan, which has closer ties with Russia than perhaps any other CIS republic, may well be satisfied with a Russian security guarantee. I had suggested in these columns some weeks before that India, Pakistan, and Israel be invited to the Washington conference. A single formula may not attract all the countries outside the NPT to sign the treaty. But a meeting in which all

non-NPT countries air their views might produce several creative ideas to bring them all into the treaty.

Indians told the Canadian team that they hoped that the NPT would be modified before 1995, the final review year, that those who stayed outside because of its discriminatory nature might be willing to join it. No thinking could be more wishful, however. The CIS republics which are outside the treaty, and Israel, India and Pakistan have no appetite to join together to demand the removal of the discriminatory clauses so that they could enter the large family of 155 nations.

In fact, none of these nations that are outside the NPT is much concerned about the discriminatory clauses which have kept India out. On the other hand, many of the countries that have signed the treaty have several problems with it, including the discriminatory clauses which can be used to deny technology to the developing nations. India can mobilise these nations and demand suitable revision of the treaty only if it is a member of the NPT family. As an outsider, it won't even be heard by the 1995 review conference which, in all likelihood, will extend the treaty indefinitely.

Whether India pursues the idea of a nuclear-safe South Asia, or the concept of nuclear restraint, it has to develop a new line of nuclear diplomacy. All these years it has remained perched on the immobile superior posture of proven capability to make the bomb and a firm determination not to make it. The posture changed in the 1980s when Americans found that Pakistan was about to make the bomb. India then shifted from yogilike position and declared that it would not make the bomb unless a Pakistani bomb compelled it to make one.

The irony of the situation is that Pakistan has officially told the U.S. it did make a number of bombs. Since India's official position is that it still has not made any bomb, the earlier assurance to the nation that it could not remain nonnuclear if Pakistan made the bomb was nothing more than a bluff. On numerous occasions, Indian official spokesman said on the floor of the Parliament and outside that the defence forces had been ordered to take "all appropriate measures" in response to the Pakistani bomb. Were all these assurances a bluff too?

India's we-do-not-have-the-bomb posture is contradicted by many of its official statements and has, therefore, lost international credibility. When a man like General K. Sundarji claims that there is an active "capability deterrent" breathing caution into the war-making minds in India and Pakistan, surely he does not mean that India has been sitting pretty with its 1974 proven capability while Pakistan went ahead to have half-a-dozen—or whatever the number—nuclear weapons that could be used in war.

The outside world, however polite it may be to India, has come to the end of its patience. India's new nuclear diplomacy can be either NPT-friendly or opposed to NPT. An NPT-friendly diplomacy may not require India

to sign the treaty. But it will require India to negotiate with Pakistan and China a series of separate agreements. With Pakistan, a nuclear-safe South Asia will mean freezing both countries capabilities at the present stage, and a pledge not to use nuclear capability against one another. The freeze accord will have to be made open to external verification. It will also mean that neither country will acquire more material for making bombs and take concerted measures for disposal of nuclear waste.

With China, India will have to negotiate an agreement which will make Tibet free of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste, and incorporate the Chinese unilateral verbal declarations that China will not make a first nuclear strike against a non-nuclear country. It is doubtful, in any case, if the second declaration applies to countries that are nuclear-capable.

If India determines to stay outside NPT, it must make that finally clear to the world and face the consequences with courage and grit. It may then proceed to make its own bombs, allowing Pakistan to make its own bombs too. That also will invite considerable international sanctions but India must have the courage to face them. The present ambiguity and ambivalence have run their course. The foreign secretary must not be compelled to face the Americans this month with the same basket of ambiguity that he has been trying to sell to various non-customers.

#### **Commentary on 'Thorium-Based' Nuclear Plant**

*BK0905051093 Delhi ALL INDIA RADIO NETWORK  
in English 0245 GMT 9 May 93*

[Commentary by defense analyst Uday Bhaskar]

[Text] The Kakrapar atomic power station was declared commercial yesterday and is now connected with the western power grid. This is an important landmark and is yet another small but significant indicator of India's overall technological capability. The arrival of Kakrapar on the national grid is also a realization of the late Dr. Bhabha's cherished dream as regards the use of thorium in India's nuclear power program. As early as 1957, Dr. Bhabha drew attention to the 500,000 tons of thorium reserves that India had and envisaged the use of this element in the national nuclear program as a step toward attainment of self-sufficiency in nuclear fuels. However, at that stage this was still difficult proposition. But today, after almost 36 years India has made a breakthrough in the use of thorium in power reactors. Briefly stated, thorium cannot be used as a fuel till it is irradiated in a reactor to produce sufficient quantities of uranium which can then be used as a reactor fuel. For this purpose, special reactors called breeder reactors are needed where the thorium is used as a blanket around the core of the reactor. These reactors use a fast neutron spectrum in which more fuel is produced than actually burnt due to the presence of thorium and over a period of time a level of self-sufficiency in nuclear fuel is



attained. Thus, at one level, Kakrapar, which uses thorium bundles along with the natural uranium fuel, represents the successful realization of a long-term objective of the Indian atomic energy program.

Another indicator of the significance of Kakrapar is the relationship between energy and national growth. It has been irrefutably established that the per capita energy consumption and energy growth rates of a nation are directly related to national economic growth. According to World Bank figures, India's per capita energy consumption in kilograms of oil equivalent was 100 units in 1965 and this increased to 231 units in 1990. Energy growth rate for the same periods was 5.6 percent and 7 percent respectively. There is no doubt that if the results of the economic liberalization are to fructify, India will need an effective economic and environmentally viable energy program. With Kakrapar going commercial, India becomes the only nation in the world to use thorium in an atomic power plant and this is a welcome development, both in terms of attaining self-sufficiency in reactor fuel and increasing the nuclear power share on the national energy scene.

#### **Pace of Missile Development Discussed**

*BK0705125193 Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi 26 Apr 93 p 5*

[Text] New Delhi, 25 April (BHASHA)—The development and production of the most modern missiles being undertaken by Indian defense scientists have reached the last stage and the Indian Armed Forces will start receiving these missiles by the end of this year or the beginning of next year.

The development of long-range surface-to-surface Agni [Fire], medium-range surface-to-surface Prithvi [Earth], long-range surface-to-air Akash [Sky], quick reaction surface-to-air Trishul [Trident] and antitank Nag [Cobra] missiles, which are now in the last stage, has put India on the list of five countries who have similar techniques. Thus, India has become one of the few elite countries capable of developing such missiles.

Defense observers believe that the introduction of medium-range surface-to-surface Prithvi missiles in the Armed Forces will lead to a remarkable increase in Indian military power. Both Pakistan and China bordering India have missiles that can strike at very long range. Pakistan possesses missiles that have a range of more than 250 km, while China is more advanced in this field. It possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles with a capability of striking targets many thousands of km away.

According to sources, the flaws detected during the second trial of the long-range surface-to-surface Agni missile last May have been closely studied by the defense scientists and they have succeeded in eliminating all the problems. According to these sources all preparations regarding the next test flight of Agni have been nearly completed and it can take place any time now.

A very big, and the most significant, achievement of the defense scientists is the surface-to-air missile Akash which has so far been tested four times. Its last test flight was conducted on 20 December last year in which a 'self-propeller launcher' was used for the first time. The Akash missile resembles the U.S. Patriot missile but defense scientists claim that in some respects it is even better and more sophisticated than the Patriot. That is why U.S. scientists are also eyeing the Akash.

The development of the short range surface-to-air Trishul missile is also in the last stage. It was successfully tested recently. So far four trial tests have been conducted on Trishul which have been very successful.

The antitank Nag missile has also reached the last stage of development. This third generation missile is capable of accurately hitting the enemy's tanks at a distance of five km. Until now, the Indian Army was dependent on French Milan antitank missiles. Milan is being produced in the country, but it is a second generation missile. Nag has been successfully tested many times and suggestions made by the Army during its trial have been incorporated in it to a large extent.

#### **IRAN**

##### **Iranian Comments on Proliferation Issues**

###### **Foreign Ministry Official's Remarks**

*NC1405134593 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 5 May 93 p 2*

[Editorial: "Middle East, Free From A.B.C. Weapons!"]

[Text] In an exclusive interview with TEHRAN TIMES, Hamid Reza 'Asefi, Director of the West European Department at the Foreign Ministry, declared that Iran wants the entire Middle East to be free from all A.B.C. (atomic, biological, chemical) weapons. He added that the Iranian delegation visiting Germany had announced, in their meetings with the German authorities, Iran's readiness to avail of Western technical cooperation in turning some of the arms factories which had been established in Iran during the past regime with the assistance of Western countries, into other types of productive units.

The words of the director of the West European department of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reveals Iran's goodwill in connection with the arms issues.

As the greatest war victim since World War II, Iran has suffered greatly during the 8-year Iraqi aggression. The Iranian nation has been the target of the most vicious attacks and has had the [as published], and has had the greatest number of casualties from the enemy's deployment of chemical weapons. As a result of such bitter experiences, Iran has always advocated the removal of all weapons of mass destruction from the entire Middle Eastern region.

Thus Iran's suggestion must be considered as a very serious proposal. However, political observers are of the opinion that powerful Western countries will not concern themselves seriously with the issue raised by Iran, and it is doubtful the mass media in those countries will take up a serious discussion of Iran's proposal.

The propaganda campaign of the preceding year has done a great deal to boost Western countries' sale of war equipments in the region at a time when Western economy faced serious problems.

On the other hand, the West is trying to expand its domination in the region by arming Israel with nuclear weapons.

In spite of that, and even if it is not going to have any result other than being recorded in history, the Iranian authorities have to put forward their proposal at international circles. The world public opinion has to be given a chance to discover the identities of the people who trade on war, and realize what countries really desire peace and brotherhood among nations.

#### Official Gives Further Explanation of 'Asefi Remarks

NC1405140593 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES  
INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY in English 6 May 93  
pp 1, 15

[Text] Tehran—Following the publication of an interview with Director General in Charge of Western Europe Hamid Reza 'Asefi on Iran's proposal for the elimination of the so-called ABC or atomic, biological and chemical weapons an informed source explained more in a statement given by the Foreign Ministry official.

He said, "We have two separate proposals which are quite different from each other. One, the entire region of the Middle East should be free of ABC weapons. Iran has not and will never try to achieve superiority in ABC weapons. We ourselves were the victims of toxic bombs during eight years of the Iraqi imposed war on Iran and sacrificed a large number of our people."

He said, "Because of this reason we declare this to be a danger for the region and so through collective efforts and for the safety of human beings should eliminate all deadly weapons, or research institutes relating to them from this region."

A second proposal is quite different from the first one, the source said. He said that this proposal was given to some of the Western countries. That proposal is that with the assistance of these countries some of the weapons factories should be transformed to civilian needs.

It should be noted that 'most of these weapons factories were built by some of the Western countries during the Shah's regime.'

#### Tehran Said Ready To Give Up Weapons of Mass Destruction

PM1005120793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 93 p 3

["Own Information", ITAR-TASS report: "Iran Ready To Destroy Mass Destruction Weapons"]

[Text] Iran has expressed readiness to rid itself of plants manufacturing weapons of mass destruction built under the Shah.

Hamid Reza Asefi, general director of the Iranian Foreign Ministry for relations with Europe, said that Tehran wants to see the Near and Middle East region free from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. According to Asefi, Iran is ready to cooperate in attaining this aim with any state or states and also with international organizations. Western technical aid could ease the conversion of certain Iranian military plants, the diplomat stressed.

### IRAQ

#### Nuclear Equipment Reportedly Hidden

NC0905192593 (Clandestine) Voice of the People of Kurdistan in Arabic 1600 GMT 9 May 93

[Text] The criminal regime is poisoning the water of the marshlands in southern Iraq. Sources of the Iraqi opposition say that in the wake of this crime, serious diseases have spread among the local inhabitants whose suffering was complicated by the shortage of medicine and medical care.

Meanwhile, well-informed sources say that the regime has concealed equipment pertaining to chemical and nuclear warfare in the marshlands for fear of their being discovered by the international inspection teams. The move has caused pollution in the area.

#### Baghdad Proposes Arsenal Information in Exchange for 'Assurances'

NC0705200393 Paris AFP in English 1931 GMT 7 May 93

[Text] Manama, May 7 (AFP)—Iraq says it is ready to provide the United Nations with complete information on its weapons arsenal in exchange for "assurances" aimed at easing sanctions on Baghdad, a U.N. arms expert said Friday [7 May].

Richard Hooper, of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said he was asked by the Iraqi authorities to carry back this message to Vienna.

"The statement was that we know and you know what the major questions are.

"We (Iraq) stand ready to deal with all of them whenever we get assurances that having dealt with these questions

we'll turn the page and move on," he said on arriving in Bahrain from Iraq at the end of an inspection mission.

In exchange for "working and answering all the questions" of the United Nations, Iraq wants the easing of the sanctions which have been imposed on Baghdad since its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

"In practice that means the IAEA must say to the Security Council that Iraq is complying with resolution 687, requiring Baghdad to supply information on the location and quantity of chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles."

The U.N. Security Council resolution also calls for the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

"The IAEA will not give assurances in advance as we consider this (Iraqi compliance) a necessary condition. But it may not be sufficient," Hooper added.

Iraq has refused to date to reveal the list of its suppliers and give complete information about its arms arsenal and production, namely its nuclear programme.

Hooper said Iraq nevertheless was cooperating with U.N. inspection missions "to establish an effective monitoring programme" of its military activity in line with Security Council resolution 715.

The American expert and his 14-member team visited 17 sites in Iraq without finding any undeclared nuclear equipment and collected water samples from 15 other locations to check their radioactivity levels, to detect any renewal of nuclear activity in Iraq.

The next U.N. mission is expected in Iraq in the second half of June, Hooper said.

## ISRAEL

### Report on Space Ballistics Program

93AA0029Z Tel Aviv MONITIN in Hebrew 3 Mar 93  
pp 6-7

[Unattributed article: "Israel Is Producing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Is Using Outer Space To Increase Its Nuclear Capability"]

[Text] The report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence (the espionage organization that replaced the KGB) for 1993 must be read to understand Israel's real military and diplomatic strength. The report was submitted to the Russian leadership last week by the chief of the espionage service Yevgeni Primakov. "Not for quotation" has received the full text concerning Israel. If even only a small portion of what is written in the report is true, and the Russian Intelligence generally had and has exact information about Israel, then Israel is a military power of the first rank. The main points in the report are:

- Since 1990, Israel made a significant and qualitative breakthrough in the development of intercontinental

ballistic missiles. This development has made possible for Israel impressive conquests in space and its exploitation for military purposes.

- Israel has the largest and most modern missile arsenal in the Middle and Near East. (The reference is to the region extending from the Indian subcontinent to Western Europe. The Editors.)
- Israel is at the beginning of a process of placing a network of military satellites in space. This network will allow Israel to use space to enhance the power of the nuclear weapons in its possession.
- It should not be assumed that there is no reasonable possibility that Israel is at some stage in the development of a thermonuclear capability (hydrogen bomb).

The full translation of the main paragraphs in the report follows:

### The Area of Nuclear Weapons

"Israel is a country that, without any official confirmation by its authorities, holds nuclear weapons and a system of missiles that can carry these weapons. The Israeli leadership does not confirm this fact, but it also does not deny the information on the existence of nuclear weapons on Israeli territory. Israel ignores the fact that the problem of the Israeli nuclear weapons will be brought up for discussion at the next plenary session of the UN General Assembly."

"Even though it is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Tel Aviv government signed, but did not ratify the international convention for defense against radioactive materials. (To this day, the Russians use the term "the Tel Aviv government," when they are referring to the Government of Israel. The chief of the Russian foreign espionage agency, Primakov, is considered to be anti-Israel. Editorial comment.) Israel also refuses to sign a series of agreements that ensure control and supervision of the export of nuclear materials."

"Israel has a nuclear reactor that uses heavy water and a separation and recycling facility for nuclear fuel. Both serve solely for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The production capacity of these two facilities is between five and 10 nuclear weapons per year. Over the years, Israel has improved its reactor so that it has changed from a reactor supplying 26 megawatts [MW] to a reactor with a capability of between 75 and 150 MW. In this way, Israel has increased its capability to produce processed plutonium from 7 to 8 kg per year, to a manufacturing capacity of 20 to 40 kg per year."

"Israel plans to establish in the near future a nuclear electric power station in which a large nuclear reactor with an output of 250 MW will be operated. Experts estimate that in addition to producing electrical power, the new reactor will be able to produce 50 kg of plutonium per year." (In that way, the capability for manufacturing nuclear weapons will be doubled theoretically. Editorial comment.)



"Many times, Israel has been accused of stealing nuclear materials, especially in the United States, England, France, and Germany. These assertions have not been proved to this day. In the most striking incident, Israel was accused in the 'disappearance' of 100 kg of enriched uranium from a factory in Pennsylvania in the United States." (The fact of the finding of the material was never published. Editorial comment.) "In contrast, Tel Aviv admitted that in the early eighties it succeeded in taking out of the United States illegally a quantity of nuclear triggers. These triggers are a very important component in the manufacture of modern nuclear weapons." (Jonathan Pollard and his Israeli handler Rafi Eytan apparently were involved in this operation. Editorial comment.)

"The uranium reserves held by Israel are sufficient to supply its needs, and even for allocating certain quantities for export, for the next 200 years. The uranium goes through a process of fission in three plants in Israel. Since 1974, the Israelis have enriched the uranium in their possession by means of a special laser-ray facility. In 1978, Israeli scientists discovered perhaps the cheapest method for separating uranium isotopes. This method is based on the differences in the magnetic properties of the nuclear particles. On this basis, Israel produced between 1970 and 1980 up to 20 nuclear weapons per year. Today, it possesses between 100 and 200 such nuclear weapons."

And here the report raises one of its most sensational points (the editors).

"Israel's very great capability in the area of launching and testing satellites allows it to continue with its nuclear development with the intention of improving its nuclear weapons in the directions of speeding the nuclear reaction and intensifying the radiation. In this context, it should not be excluded from the realm of possibility that Tel Aviv is interested also in producing nuclear hydrogen weapons." The exact meaning of these words, if they are correct, of course, is that Israel is using its space research for the purpose of increasing the power of the nuclear weapons that it holds (upgrading), old ones as well as new ones. Only Russia and the United States have such a technological capability (the editors).

The report of the Russian Intelligence continues, saying: "At this stage, Israel is capable of manufacturing all of the basic poisonous materials required for the manufacture of chemical weapons. This capability includes the manufacture of nerve materials, materials that cause severe wounds, and materials that can cause partial paralysis. There is no real proof that Israel has biological weapons. But at the same time, it should be noted that a large-scale biological study was conducted in Israel, several of whose characteristics could have military uses. Israeli research laboratories are closely linked with military research laboratories in the United States. Most of the studies conducted in these laboratories relate to ways of defending against biological weapons. The Israeli

scientific infrastructure is so ramified that Israel would have no problem in very quickly turning its efforts toward the manufacture of biological weapons."

"Israel possesses the largest and most modern stockpile of missiles in the region of the Middle East and the Near East. Systems and parts that were manufactured outside of Israel are found only in the short-range Israeli missile system. The rest of the missile systems are manufactured entirely in Israel." In the short-range area, Israel manufactures two MRA-type missile systems: MRA-290, whose range is 40 km and MRA-350, whose range is between 40 and 150 km. The launcher of the MRA-350 missile is mounted on a tank chassis. Each tank carries four missiles."

"The development of the Jericho ground-to-ground missile began in 1963. In the beginning, the Israeli Army was equipped with the Jericho-1, which is a short-range missile, up to 480 km, and it is operated with solid fuel. In 1973, the Israeli Army was equipped with mobile Jericho-1 missiles. Between 1977 and 1981, the army was equipped with more than 100 Jericho-2 missiles. The range of these missiles is 750 km, and they are defined as medium-range missiles. In 1989, Israel completed and tested successfully the Jericho-2B missile, whose range is 1,300 km. Following the entry of this missile into military service, Israel is capable of hitting any target in the Middle East and in the Near East." And here comes the second sensational revelation in the report (the editors). "Along with the development of the 'Jericho' missiles, at the end of the eighties, Israel achieved a most significant breakthrough in the area of manufacturing intercontinental ballistic missiles and using space for military purposes. By means of the series of 'Ofek' satellites, Israel placed in space a series of military satellites, each of which has a different capability, purpose, and use." Understandably, the Russians would not provide in the report all that they know about us. But even granted that, the material that they publish about us is very impressive.

#### Nonconventional First-Strike Option Viewed

93AA0033Z 'Ofra NEQU'DA in Hebrew Apr 93 pp 28-31, 64

[Article by Yo'av Gilbar: "Again, a Threat to Survival"]

[Text] Near the end of the War of Independence, Ben-Gurion convened the high command of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), to hear and be heard at an event that was a kind of early summing-up of the war. The commanders talked about technical, tactical, and organizational lessons that had been learned in battle, and brought up problems in the realm of discipline and conditions of service. Ben-Gurion's mind was on other things. He was looking ahead to the days after the war, and was not swept along by the general atmosphere of exultation (the word "euphoria" had not yet come into use) after the liberation of the Negev and Galilee.

Will there be an "end"—even if the war ends now?...and if there is peace...was there ever a war that was not preceded by peace? The Arab peoples have been beaten at our hands. Will they forget...this insult? We must assume they have a sense of pride. We will try to make peace—but you need two sides for peace. Is there any certainty that they will not want to take revenge on us? Let us face the truth: we won, not because our army works miracles, but because the Arab army is falling apart. Will it always be falling apart?

From this start, Ben-Gurion went on to raise a series of basic questions about the place of security and the IDF in society and the State, questions that would continue to be the focus in the years to come. Israel's security concept was consolidated in those years in response to the geopolitical facts the War of Independence had created. True, it was never actually put down in a document, but it expressed a line of thought that was accepted by the IDF's top brass, and by the political leadership, and was reflected in the Army's structure, goals, and plans. It was founded on two assumptions:

A) The border of the State of Israel is difficult to defend; actually, almost impossible to defend. The ratio between the area of the State (20,000 square km) to the perimeter of its land borders (988 km) means that it does not have depth or breadth for maneuvering, even in tactical terms. The effect of this lack of depth was even more serious, for nowhere was the long land border based on natural obstacles. The natural conclusion from this basic assumption was that the State of Israel must endeavor to wage war beyond her borders, in enemy territory. First in terms of "carrying the war into enemy territory as quickly as possible," and then by following up with an early counterattack, called in jargon "preventive war," which is in effect a war initiated [by us.]

B) Within the confines of the Green Line, most of the population is within hostile artillery range.

The natural conclusion from this basic assumption was that the State of Israel must keep an air force so powerful that it will be able, not only to keep the skies clear and protect the land Army and the populace from enemy air forces, but also to protect them from his artillery and, in effect, to tip the scale in the land battle quickly.

From these conclusions, and from the restraints of human and financial resources, the Israeli security doctrine which determined the structure and size of the Army, the balance between its various components, its military doctrine, and its operational procedures, was fashioned. This "doctrine" was partially applied in the Sinai Campaign, and completely applied, with stunning results, in the Six Day War.

When the State of Israel and the IDF were overcome by euphoria (the word was already in use by then) in the aftermath of the Six Day War, there was no one around to slap them in the face and say the kind of things Ben-Gurion had said when the War of Independence was coming to an end. Moshe Dayan, who, in contrast to

Ben-Gurion, was a product of the IDF, did not have the distance from it that he would have needed to save them. The political higher echelon lacked the perspective and vision. The geopolitical changes the Six Day War had brought about required a renewed and thorough examination of the security conception, to adapt it to the new reality the war had created. Such an examination was never done. The State of Israel and the IDF stayed with the defense doctrine that had been fashioned in 1949 to fit the geopolitical reality the War of Independence had created, and which had changed markedly since then.

The new land border (600 km along the borders and 118,000 square km of territory) gave Israel the dimension of depth she had lacked within the Green Line. Of course, this means depth in relative terms. Also, considerable portions of the new land border, 180 km in Sinai and 166 km along the Jordan River and Dead Sea, were based on natural barriers. Another problematic section, in the Golan Heights, was short enough that an artificial barrier could be created to complete the natural barrier.

Most of the inhabitants of the State of Israel were now out of artillery range, and even out of the air range of the main confrontation state, Egypt. Even more important, the situation was reversed, and important enemy centers, even capitals, were close enough from then on for the IDF to threaten them.

Despite these changes, the State of Israel went to war in 1973 as though she was still inside the Green Line and facing the dangers inherent in it: from inflexible lines, and without using the territorial depth to wage a defensive battle in places where that could have been helpful, relying too greatly on the air force, without taking into account its limitations and priorities, because of the desire to bring the war into enemy territory as quickly as possible, at the expense of the orderly deployment needed for defense and for absorbing the first blow.

An additional fact that had been true since the Six Day War, and resulted from our control over all of the western part of the Land of Israel, was the return of the Palestinians as a factor in the arena. Against this background, terror renewed internally and intensified all along the new borders. Internal terror, which had been the Palestinians' main line of action against the Jewish community since the 1930's had disappeared after their mass flight during the War of Independence. Terror along the borders, which had characterized the period from the War of Independence up to the Sinai Campaign, stopped after 1956, except for occasional actions by the PLO, which though they renewed in January 1965, were very far from being a real problem, or even the threat that infiltration had been in the 1950's.

Terror within Israel was already sharply curbed in 1968. The campaign against terror along the Jordanian border lasted until September 1970. But, its successful conclusion did not stop the phenomenon. It started up again on the Lebanese border, which had been almost completely quiet from the War of Independence until 1969, and to

this day no solution has been found there. Again in 1968, terror extended to the international airports, and since then has spread over the entire world. How central it was in the range of Israel's security problems can be disputed. But it is hard to disagree that it was and is a nuisance that has frequently distracted us from the main thing. It is enough to mention Golda Me'ir's trip to Vienna on the eve of the Yom Kippur War.

The combination of terror inside the State, and shooting incidents and incursions along the borders quickly put an end to the illusion that the brilliant victory in the Six Day War would bring an end to the conflict, or at least an extended lull. When the number of such incidents, and the number of casualties, grew, the euphoria gave way to disappointment, which grew deeper and deeper as more and more incidents mounted into an actual war of attrition.

Despite the disappointment, the State of Israel stood up in the War of Attrition with more self-confidence than she had in any previous war. The Six Day War put an end to a 30-year period that had continued since the Arab revolt in the 1930's, in which Israeli society felt that its very existence was threatened. The question of whether the threat was real or not does not change the reality of the feeling, natural to a society living within artillery range, and without depth. The transition may not have been sharp and clear, but the defeat of the threatening armies and the distancing of the borders gradually brought a sense of relief. True, some talk of the threat to survival was heard later, too, and still continues to be heard, but this was, and still is, more just lipservice and a kind of traditional way of expression in times of public discussion of defense questions, or just an argument to use in political debates, than a reflection of authentic feeling. The weakening of the sense of a threat to survival was reflected first and foremost in the exacerbation of the centrifugal tendencies in Israeli society.

Within the heterogeneous immigrant society that has developed here were hidden the sources of many tensions—political, cultural, ethnic, social, and economic—that could have easily burst if not for the counterweight of the external threat to its existence: in the days of the Arab revolt, the Second World War, the struggle against the British, the War of Independence, and since. The threat to survival, clear to all, created a common denominator for the opposing elements, and strengthened the tendency toward solidarity in society as a whole, despite the internal tensions between the new and old Jewish communities, Right and Left, secular and religious, oriental and westerner, rich and poor. This solidarity crystallized around what was called the "community consensus," or "national" consensus," which set the bounds and rules of the game for internal disputes and defined all that was outside them as "dissent."

After the Six Day War, the consensus crumbled more and more, and the various polarizations in society worsened. Removal of the threat to survival made it possible

to demand that topics other than security be emphasized, and lent legitimacy to opinions that earlier would have been considered heretical. It also undermined the rules of the game in battles between those holding opposing views. The process was gradual but steady, and at its center was the dispute over how to translate the military victory into a diplomatic achievement. The debate over the division of the land, which began when "partition" was first suggested in 1937, and was pushed to the fringes when the division became a reality, was reignited when it again became a theoretical option, and has been throwing its shadow over every other question on the national agenda ever since.

The reality that the whole land of Israel is united, with all the problems that come along with that, versus the theoretical option of redividing it, and the hope—or illusion—that redivision would solve at least some of these problems, was, and still is, the basis of the political polarization. The swift economic growth following the war, and abandonment of the policy of restraint that preceded it, increased the social-economic polarization, and made the gaps worse. Society was swept up in the lust after material goods, and without the counterpressure of the external threat to rein it in, this lust grew stronger than most other values on the ladder, [finally] becoming almost the supreme value. The "quest for success" became a symbol and something to be emulated without worrying too much about how the success was achieved or how authentic it really was.

These social changes did not take long to influence the IDF, which after the Six Day War, to a certain extent provided an alibi for the society with the new values. Its prestige skyrocketed as a result of the victory and from the public repercussions of it, and the quest for success depended on it and fed from it. Within both the old and new urban middle-class, for which "prestigious" Army service was not at the head of its interests before the war, there began a growing rush to try to get into the units, which had begun to be called—first in newspaper jargon, and later also more officially—the "elite units." That expression itself suggests the social makeup of these units as much as it does their professional expertise and level of motivation.

Another measure of the rise in prestige of the Army was the growing return to regular service after the Six Day War, which cannot be explained by economic circumstances alone. This happened during a period of rapid economic growth, in which the civilian market presented attractive alternatives, but nevertheless, no one had been knocking on the regular Army's doors during the period of the restraint which preceded the war, and was characterized by widespread unemployment.

The change in the Army's place in society had far-ranging implications internally as well. Until the Six Day War, Army commanders had been anonymous to most of Israeli society. The circle of officers who were exposed to the general public through the media was limited and included mainly generals of the general staff and regional



commands, chief corps commanders, or their equivalents. This practice was enforced by strict censorship and had existed since the end of the War of Independence. Among the rules Ben-Gurion set as part of the depoliticization he imposed on the Army at the war's end was also this rule of limiting personal exposure.

In the atmosphere of euphoria that prevailed in the State, the entire layer of division commanders in the war, and even a few of the regiment commanders and staff officers, not to speak of the more senior officers, was exposed to the eyes of the press and public with great fanfare a few days after the end of the Six Day War. The commanders were not exposed as "Colonel R." or "Lieutenant Colonel D." but by their full names. Their exploits, decisions, and biographies filled newspapers, radio programs, albums, and books on the war. Everyone sang their praises. The units starting being called by their commanders' names, not by their own numbers or names: Shmulik's, or Albert's, brigade; Yosi's, or Uzi's regiment, etc. It had been done otherwise in all the descriptions of battles of the War of Independence, and the actions since, including those in the Sinai Campaign, which had been written about in *Ma'arakhot*, and in most of the brigade memorial books that appeared in the 1950's and 1960's, no names were mentioned except for casualties (and even they were mentioned mainly in the commemorative literature), "these: Company Commander G. tells how second in command No. 2 led the attack," and so forth. Nobody would have dreamed of calling the 82d Airborne Division in the World War the "Ridgeway Division," or the 8th Camp, the "Montgomery Camp"!

The commanders, men who had worked for almost 20 years in relative anonymity, turned almost overnight into the darlings of the public, and were the subject of a personality cult that attributed the victory to them. They were not ready for this revolution, and not all of them knew how to deal with it. The exposure, and the public relations that followed, became the norm, and even became the subject of competition and a model to emulate. This did not end with the group of officers exposed to the public eye immediately after the war, but widened to include officers who replaced them, and took on full legitimacy. Little by little, reporters and bohemians turned into the camp followers of the senior officers and fostered their public image.

When the dam of exposure burst under the pressure of admiration and flattery, it was impossible to close it again. But the connection between the Army commanders and the world of the media and entertainment limelight, and business, was not automatically positive. When the Army disappointed expectations in the Yom Kippur War, it was exposed to criticism from the public and the media with the same force as it had been to their admiration after the Six Day War, and again—it was not prepared for it, and had not learned how to deal with such a situation. Today, with the process that began then still continuing, dealing with the public exposure is a problem not only for the senior staff, but also for every

company commander who has had any trouble with his men, or an accident in his unit, and sometimes even for his wife or girlfriend.

This personality cult and public exposure has had its effects on the military/professional level, which this is not the place to go into in detail. Nonprofessional "public opinion" that sought out heroes attributed the victory to individuals—actually, to the military genius of the commanders who led their units in war and would be leading the Army in the years to come. Some of them truly believed what "public opinion" attributed to them. The result was gradual but steady erosion of the stature given to military theory and professional training, in favor of experience and achievements of the past, which could not be relied upon to always repeat themselves in the future. The conclusion reached in the atmosphere of worship and flattery after the war was not that proper laying of infrastructure and good preparation—or, alternatively, the weakness of the enemy—were what had brought the victory, but rather that it was due to the brilliant leadership of the commanders. The inevitable result was that the only thing the IDF still had left from its battle doctrine, when it was fired upon by surprise on 6 October 1973, was what the platoon commander of the spearhead always yelled: "We've found them! Forward! Attack!"

It is not the only case in military history where exaggerated dependence on experience—which is nothing more than a coincidental combination of successes and failures of an individual in certain circumstances he was tried in—instead of on study, which is the application of universal professional experience, ensured that an army would prepare for the same war it had just fought, the one where it had amassed the experience. The IDF expected a war just like the Six Day War. At the same moment, the enemy was preparing for a war of a completely different kind, which would highlight components of the force which had not sufficiently been taken into account, for there was not enough experience in how to use them or stand up against them.

Some of the changes that took place in the character of the Army and society after the Six Day War were unavoidable, and resulted directly from it. But, others were unnecessary, and were the result of the intoxication of victory. The problem was not necessarily the changes themselves, but rather the low awareness, at that time, of their significance, and the lack of remedies for some of them, and answers that could lighten the damage from others. The shock that came over Israeli society and the IDF after the Yom Kippur War made people think, and over the years led to correction of some of the deviations from the norm in the professional and normative realms. Other distortions in the two realms actually deepened, as became during the Lebanon War and the intifadah. But the greatest change is still before us, and the sooner we become aware of its significance the better.

After 26 years in which Israeli society was free of the feeling that its very existence was threatened, when it

felt it could make mistakes and even pay a price for them, but that this would not be the price of survival, this feeling has returned and becomes stronger the more the reports pile up of the arming of the confrontation states and the Arab and Muslim periphery with missile and unconventional weapons. Signs of this could be seen during the Gulf War, and they will grow stronger the more the nuclear capacity of the Islamic countries grows, and the more we are within range, this time of missiles, and in a situation of asymmetric threat before which we have no depth and no second strike option. Under conditions like these, there may be no escape from return to the basic assumptions that were the foundation of the security doctrine fashioned after the War of Independence. The State

of Israel may be back in a few years to a situation where it will not be able to take the chance of absorbing a strike, and therefore will be forced to make the first strike, which could be unconventional.

A situation like this requires a society that can come together around a basic consensus, and produce reliable leadership that will be acceptable to the majority of the public and hold an open dialogue with them—to clarify the situation for them and hear what their hearts are saying—and make difficult decisions, that affect survival, quickly and under pressure. In light of the experience of the last few years, and the last few weeks, does it look like this is on the horizon?

## RUSSIA

### Conference Debates Chemical Weapons Destruction

PM1405133893 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report by A. Peslyak, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [100501] Today in Moscow there opened the first Russian conference on medical and ecological problems of the destruction of chemical weapons. Taking part are scientists, chemists, biologists, doctors, specialists of various departments. They will discuss how safely, beginning in 1995, to destroy over 40,000 tonnes of mustard gas, lewisite, and other toxins. After all, Russia recently signed the international convention. Civilian and military experts have been complementing each other for dozens of years and prevented any incidents or the appearances of a chemical Chernobyl but the stocks remain. In destroying them we are concerned primarily for people's health, that is the weapons' destroyers and the population in the regions where there are establishments, depots, and plants. The environment must also be preserved. Let us add that a lack of knowledge of the real situation often gives rise to stories and fears, and more active work with the population and the local authorities by all our secret departments is called on to struggle against a kind of chemical phobia. [100557] [video shows chemical establishments, soldiers, conference delegates]

### Phase Out of Obsolete Missiles Implemented

LD1305195593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1923 GMT 13 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Four regiments of strategic missile forces will discontinue their operational vigil from May 14. Forty intercontinental ballistic missiles will be removed from operational status, although the Russian parliament has not considered and has not ratified the START-2 treaty.

The removal of 40 missiles from operational status has no bearing on the START-2 treaty and there can be no question of any one-sided disarmament, Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander-in-chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, told IZVESTIYA's military news analyst.

"This is a routine measure. The missiles which we remove from operational duty belong to the second generation of national ICBMs which have already exceeded the combat service length," the general said.

A further increase in the number of such missiles is inadmissible due to both a sharp increase in operational

costs and safety considerations. By 1995, according to Sergeyev, approximately 60 per cent of all missile systems will become obsolete.

Notwithstanding that, the combat readiness of strategic missiles forces will not decline in any way. The obsolete systems will be replaced by up-to-date ones, General Sergeyev said.

When asked whether a delay in the ratification of the START-2 treaty in the parliament affects the combat state of missile forces, the general said: "We are in a state of high combat readiness and will maintain it subsequently as well".

At the same time Sergeyev said: "We now effect natural, routine cutbacks. But if the treaty ratification process is dragged out, cutbacks can eventually create advantages for one of the parties to the treaty and result in an upsetting of balance in strategic forces in favour of the U.S."

This would seriously damage the disarmament process and the building of international confidence, the general maintains.

### Moscow Sets Procedures for Privatizing Nuclear Enterprises

OW1105072593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0602 GMT 11 May 93

[From the "INTERFAX Business Report" feature; item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed a decree which lists forty five enterprises and research institutes not subject to privatization, including the state scientific and production association Luch, the electro-mechanical factory Avangard, the production association Mayak, and the scientific and production association Energiya.

Industry experts support partial privatization: a state role is needed to guarantee safety standards and international commitments on atomic energy, weapons and technology.

Federal authorities will hold a 49% share package in privatized enterprises for three years.

Enterprises up for privatization include the Priargunskoye chemical mining association (Irkutsk region, Eastern Siberia), Russia's only uranium mining enterprise.

### 'Bargain Sale' of Strategic Reserves Hit

PM1005171793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 May 93 First Edition p 7

[Commentary by Petr Belov under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "We Sell Uranium, We Disclose Classified Information... Who Reaps the Benefit?"]



[Text] Recently the newspapers reported the sale at a fabulously low price of Russian strategic uranium reserves and the organization of a joint experiment to improve ABM defenses.

Let me remark that these deals, which are profitable only to the United States, are served up by our mass media as Russian initiatives. What is more, we are supposedly foisting them on the United States, trying to win them over, and beating our breasts—when suddenly these ambitious Americans grow stubborn. And in order to persuade them to “meet us halfway,” we can see our way to incidentally lowering the price of uranium and plutonium and making the terms of the experiment such that under them the essence of our latest design and technological achievements in the sphere of plasma and gas dynamics is disclosed, that is to say, yet another leak of information takes place, making further cooperation unnecessary.

How is it possible to agree to bargain sales of strategic reserves of uranium and plutonium, whose value will rise continuously as natural energy sources are exhausted? Even today their value exceeds that of our gold reserve, in the opinion of Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov. The profitability of the deal in question amounts to 2,500 percent, but not for Russia—for the United States. That is today. Who has calculated the energy costs of the 21st century? Is it permissible in these conditions to disregard the interests of our descendants by concluding such long-term contracts (for 20 years) for a miserly sum—\$13 billion?

The sale of nuclear materials at ridiculously low prices cannot facilitate international stability either. Such actions deprive us of the possibility, in the event of unfavorable circumstances, of sharply increasing our defense capability, while they preserve the U.S. potential for doing so. And who will vouchsafe that this will not provoke Washington, for example, to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty or from the START-II treaty which is currently being discussed in the Russian Supreme Soviet?

Our initiative on the use of plasma weapons to disable missile warheads is really dangerous to international stability. It is fundamentally impermissible, in my view, because it sets a precedent for testing ABM weapons operating on new physical principles. It is even more unacceptable to stage joint tests without prior multilateral discussion of the concrete restrictions on such principles and elements laid down in the 13 June 1972 Agreed Statement regarding the ABM defense limitation treaty.

Incidentally, it is possible to satisfy oneself that the initiatives on joint experiments are not Russia's by studying the memorandum of the Heritage Foundation “brain trust” entitled: “Making the World Safe for the United States,” published exactly one year ago. The actual idea of using plasma weapons is not new, including using them to destroy such targets as missile

warheads, whose flight in dense atmospheric strata is accompanied by the formation of an area of superheated and therefore ionized gas. If such objects encounter another area of equally ionized gas in their way, by the laws of interaction between electrically charged bodies (in our case plasma formations) forces arise between them which can alter the warhead's trajectory and in certain circumstances even destroy it.

It is possible to envisage not just the theoretical but also the technical realization of a large-scale experiment acting on one, at the most two warheads. It is this interest, scientific more than anything else, and also a natural desire for cooperation which explains the birth of the idea under examination in some circles of the Russian military-industrial complex. And this is perfectly natural, as is their desire for additional funding, foreign business trips, and so forth.

“Our” proposal on the joint experiment will most likely not go unnoticed. But we risk not only squandering our intellectual resources but also giving a direct motive for violating the ABM Treaty. Surely the “global defense of the United States and its allies” (the goal of the experiment) contradicts the requirements of Article 1.2: “not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of its country's territory and not to create a base for its defense,” while the experiment itself contradicts Article 5.1: “not to create, not to use, and not to deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”

There is another paradoxical “exchange”—of the expertise of tens of thousands of scientific projects by the Soros Fund, allegedly with the aim of assessing the prospects of implementing and funding them. The real value of the ideas in question is valued in billions. Only around a hundred inventors have actually been paid though, and even they have received only \$500 each. In the same way the aforementioned experiment could bring the United States savings of \$30 billion against costs of \$300 billion. But how much do we get out of it?

Of course, it can be objected: We are faced with ruin, we have no funds, there is nowhere for weapons-grade uranium or plutonium to go; the Tomsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies is against shipping in and constructing a storehouse for nuclear materials. Or, for instance, Armaz-16 deputies are against dismantling nuclear warheads. What is to be done? After all, they are promising billions for joint work on ABM defense; and promising to withdraw COCOM restrictions. Are these not good arguments? True, the West does not keep all its promises...

The best solution to crisis situations, as is well known, is to avoid getting into them. The experience of recent years in our foreign policy testifies to the need for a corresponding law regulating the procedure for preparing foreign policy initiatives and establishing personal responsibility for their implementation.

## UKRAINE

### Defense Minister on Nuclear Weapons

LD1105141793 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1400 GMT 11 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Nekrasova]

[Excerpts] Lvov May 11 TASS—Problems of building up the Ukrainian Army and the Russo-Ukrainian dispute over the Black Sea Navy and nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory were discussed yesterday by representatives of local public circles with Ukrainian Defence Minister Kostantin Morozov in the course of the traditional "Zankovetskie soirees", held at the local theatre. Morozov came here to meet people's deputies, representatives of the local authorities, businessmen and clergymen. [passage omitted]

"Nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory are an equally painful and disputable problem. Their presence is an unquestionably containing factor," the minister said. "But since we have such weapons, we shall not agree to their maintenance and upkeep by other states. Moreover, they are worth absolutely nothing if we have no corresponding scientific and production facilities of our own. If our Supreme Soviet ratifies the START-1 treaty and the Lisbon Protocol to it, we shall have no problems with dismantling these deadly weapons. It is only a matter of time. But such a decision will be taken only when Ukraine gets the right to own the dismantled materials. It will be detrimental to our independent state, if we give up nuclear warheads free of charge only to buy fuel for Ukrainian power plants from Russia for world prices."

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**EC Laws for High-Tech Exports Viewed**

AU0405112193 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
3 May 93 pp 26-27

[Unattributed report: "Cobra With a Gap"]

[Text] As so often, the bad news was spread by annoyed members of the U.S. Secret Service in Bonn. Government spokesman Dieter Vogel confirmed it laconically.

At a news conference in February, Vogel admitted that two German companies again supplied machinery for the planned construction of a poison gas plant in Libya. The export was approved, and in all likelihood the exporters did not know about the military use of the heading and cutting machines for tunnels and of the cables, he stressed. Investigations by the public prosecutor have not yet been concluded.

Trouble of that kind may afflict Bonn even more frequently in the future. The scandal surrounding German participation in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons factories is only beginning to be uncovered.

Completely new possibilities have opened up for the exporters of the deadly technology at the beginning of the year when the EC single market was implemented. Customs inspections no longer exist. Thus, the German "foreign trade law" that was drastically tightened one year ago is no longer worth very much. After the worldwide outrage about German participation in Saddam Husayn's missile project, the Bundestag tightened the regulations concerning the illegal trade with military high-tech equipment considerably in January 1992.

Managers who willfully contribute to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology face a two-year imprisonment.

Since January, however, this threat is not very effective. It is now possible for the mullah regime in Tehran, which craves weapons, or its Iraqi enemy to transport complete high-tech equipment for the enrichment of uranium and for the production of missile parts without any controls from Germany to the EC ports of Lisbon, Dublin, or Piraeus.

The German laws do not apply there. In addition, the local customs authorities do not have the knowledge and personnel required to find out what equipment can be used for military purposes.

Since customs offices no longer exist along the border with EC countries, there is a gap in the warning and investigation network, called "Cobra," of the Cologne authority. Until December 1992, every export procedure was registered twice: first, when it was announced to the German customs office and for a second time when the export actually took place.

"We no longer know now when the export is actually carried out," one of the investigators pointed out. Deals that are carried out in other EC countries to avoid German laws are hardly traceable, and suspicious shipments can no longer be stopped at German borders.

Other countries are also worried about the current situation. The authors of a study that has just been published by the British armament control organization "Safer World" claim that the new freedom "will naturally promote and facilitate illegal exports" throughout Europe.

As early as two years ago, EC Commissioner Bangemann, who was responsible for this sphere at the time, called for a "pragmatic reply" to this "comprehensive problem."

However, nearly one and one-half years elapsed before his officials submitted a proposal as to how "dual-use goods" that can be used for military purposes can be controlled. However, the government officials from the EC capitals rejected this "proposal for a Council regulation concerning the control of the export of certain dual-use goods," submitted in September 1992.

A second proposal that was to have entered into force last Friday [30 April] was not accepted either.

Basically, "the whole project is illogical," an expert of the German negotiating delegation in Brussels admitted. Before harmonizing the export controls for dual-use products, a common line must first be adopted concerning the export of classical firing weapons, such as tanks, guns, and aircraft.

However, the British and French Governments in particular do not want to accept any rules here. The former major powers view the deals with Mirage fighters, Exocet missiles, or Challenger tanks as a national security issue—for which the Community is not responsible according to the existing agreement.

Thus, Bangemann's proposal was extremely vague. According to the Community decision, the permit procedures are only to be harmonized within Europe. Whether ultra-modern machine tools that can also be used for the production of weapons should be supplied to India, or whether high-precision test stands for engines should be delivered to Brazil should rather be discussed by the governments outside EC bodies.

Even if agreement should be reached, it will remain unclear in the foreseeable future how it can be ensured that the competent authorities adopt a uniform approval procedure. After all—this is the meaning of the single market—Spanish export permits should be valid Europe-wide, just like the German ones.

However, as long as false information in export applications are punishable with imprisonment in Germany whereas such offenses do not exist in the Spanish Penal Code, the "shift of traffic" (EC jargon) would hardly be

avoidable. Military technology would be exported through countries where there is little resistance.

"In any case, the federal government will prevent the EC regulation from becoming a handbook for the legal evasion of German laws," Volker Hahn, chief negotiator for the Economics Ministry in Brussels, promised.

Yet, he does not know how this should be achieved. None of the EC partners, all of whom carefully avoid infringing each other's sovereignty, do not want to establish a central authority or at least a permanent coordination group against illegal technology transfer.

In a new confidential draft EC officials suggested a mutual duty to inquire. Thus, Spanish exporters should be allowed to order any equipment from all EC countries and to deliver it to the whole world with Spanish approval. However, if goods from a dual-use list that still has to be prepared are involved, the Spanish officials should be obliged to ask their colleagues in the country where the goods actually are.

Knowing that such risky constructions would fail because of the language barrier, in the next few years, the EC planners want to provide for a long and in some countries even for a permanent "transition period." Thus, "there will be no legal changes in the near future," Hahn stressed. The threat of punishment will not be removed.

For this reason, Olaf Simonsen from the Eschborn-based Federal Export Office does not consider the new situation really serious. The official responsible for risky export deals sees no problems in the uncontrolled single market: There have always been enterprises that evaded the law.

All right then.

## FRANCE

### Government Poised To Resume Nuclear Tests

PM0505164593 Paris LE MONDE in French 4 May 93 p 14

[Unattributed report: "Atomic Energy Commission Is Poised To Resume Nuclear Tests After July"]

[Text] The leaders of the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) believe that the resumption of nuclear tests by France is "a necessity" for the national deterrent. It believes that these tests are "irreplaceable" and hopes for "a rapid decision" in favor from the government after Francois Mitterrand's decision to suspend blasts until July, like the Americans and Russians. The CEA has already taken steps "for the possible resumption of tests in the second half of 1993."

That essentially is what was stated by Philippe Rouvillois and Roger Baleras, respectively CEA general administrator and director of military applications, when they

were heard at the end of last week by the deputies of the National Assembly defense commission. The two men explained that the resumption of tests on the Mururoa atoll were "to the forefront of their concerns."

For the first time the general administrator gave a tally of the number of French nuclear tests from their beginning through the unilateral moratorium in April 1992, that is 161 tests as against 961 in the United States and 657 in the former Soviet Union. So far that number had been secret and the details published here and there in France had never been authenticated by the CEA. Employing a staff of 6,000, the military applications department received a budget of 9 billion francs [Fr] for 1993, mostly from the Defense Ministry. Since 1988, according to Mr. Rouvillois, this budget has declined by 27 percent or even 30 percent if you take account of the Fr320 million reduction in early 1993. Since 1988 the military applications department has had some 5,000 resignations.

The CEA general administrator specified for the first time that the production of plutonium for defense needs stopped in 1992 and that there would be a sufficiency of enriched uranium in a few years, which will pose problems (final disposal, reprocessing of stored waste, dismantling of installations, financial costs, and manpower numbers) in connection with the gradual shutdown of the Marcoule and Pierrelatte sites in the Southeast.

### A Weapon With Controllable Yield

"From the scientific and technical viewpoint," Mr. Rouvillois stated with regard to weapons, "the resumption of the tests is a necessity for maintaining the nuclear deterrence research and development tools. For today tests are essential to validate concepts and calculations. A rapid decision, which is of course a matter for the government, is very desirable."

For his part Mr. Baleras emphasized "the irreplaceable nature of nuclear testing, which is a real laboratory physical experiment which, of course, could not be done on the same scale on the territory of the mother country." He noted that the CEA has drawn up the PALEN (preparation for limiting nuclear tests) plan, which consists in finalizing means and techniques of simulation but does not do away with full-scale tests. Whether it is a matter of computer modeling techniques or of high-powered lasers, any simulation according to the military applications department boss, implies waiting periods, credits, and the continuation of tests—albeit a limited number—in order for technicians to "validate the models' relevance and adjust the simulation parameters."

Mr. Baleras gave the deputies new details about the long-range air to surface missile which is to be the future second nuclear component alongside the missiles installed on submarines. The long-range air to surface missile will be installed on the Rafale and Britain has been invited by France to join this major program.



The military applications department boss noted that it will be a question of developing a warhead unique to the long-range air to surface missile and that "this weapons system will probably involve a controllable yield." Which means that, like some U.S. arms, the warhead will have a destructive power whose effects will vary depending on the effect it is expected to have on the target.

(As soon as they were made known, the statements by the CEA leaders gave rise to a response from the New Zealand Government issued by prime minister Jim Bolger, who said he would be "very disappointed" if France resumes its tests in the Pacific. "We shall make our viewpoint known to France," Mr. Bolger added. For its part Greenpeace noted that in Auckland that it is prepared to send a ship to Mururoa if France resumes its blasts).

## GERMANY

### Environment Minister Rejects Criticism of Plutonium Shipment by Air

AU1005162593 Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* in German 10 May 93 p 6

["TL" report: "Controversy Over Plutonium Air Transport"]

[Text] Bonn, 8-9 May—The FRG Government has rejected the criticism of the planned air shipment of about 1,100 kg of plutonium, which is being stored in Hanau, and continues to stick to its plan.

In a statement for the Bundestag Environment Committee, which will meet on Wednesday [12 May], FRG Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer (Christian Democratic Union) rejects the criticism by the Nuclear Control Institute and its president, Paul Leventhal.

The institute is a private institution, which is close to the Greens, the statement says, and in the past Leventhal has tried unsuccessfully to have sea shipments of plutonium banned. The Social Democratic Party of Germany had called on the government to present its position after the study became known.

Bonn wants to take the 123 fuel elements of the closed-down "fast breeder," which are stored in the so-called "federal bunker" in Hanau, by air to the Scottish breeder reactor facility in Dounreay. In his expert report, Leventhal criticizes the fact that Bonn wants to permit the shipment in normal type-B containers (nine meters falling test, 0.5-hours fire test), even though in the United States there are considerably higher requirements for air shipment containers for plutonium. This is rejected by the study.

Even though in the United States there are indeed considerably higher requirements than the current standards of the International Energy Agency, there, too, they have a small container that meets these requirements. For larger amounts this problem does not arise in the civilian sector, since no recycling is done. In the military sector civilian regulations are not valid, according to the FRG Government's statement. In this sector many shipments of major amounts of plutonium are still carried out under conditions that are not known here.

According to Toepfer's report, in 1996 at the earliest the International Energy Agency wants to establish new, higher standards for containers used for the air shipment of plutonium and will probably remain below U.S. standards. In addition, a special pattern was used for the shipment of the fuel elements: The containers and the special qualities of the cargo offer the same safety as the undisputed type-C containers. In the case in hand, the cargo meets considerably higher requirements, according to the Toepfer study: plutonium in the form of sintered pills, additionally encased in hollow tubes [Hohlrohre]. The FRG Environment Ministry was unable to say exactly when the shipment will take place if the application is approved.

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